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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: AN AGE OF DOUBT
Americans throughout the nineteenth century believed that 
the phenomenal growth and prosperity of their nation had de­
pended upon two basic factors: the seemingly inexhaustible
supply of fertile, resource-laden lands to the West, and, to 
exploit those Western riches, an ever-increasing population, 
including welcome additions of immigrants from Europe, Dur­
ing most of their history, Americans had greeted newcomers 
from Europe hospitably. They not only assumed that their 
nation, as an experiment in individual freedom, should serve 
as an asylum for the oppressed of the Old World, but they 
also realized that the country needed able-bodied and con­
scientious immigrants for its destined expansion across a 
virgin continent. Even if Americans looked at times with 
scorn upon the apparently ignorant character of many of the 
nineteenth-century immigrants, they nevertheless believed 
that the immigrants provided the brawn necessary to comple­
ment the brains and capital supplied by native-born citizens 
in the march across the Western wilderness. As long as open 
lands remained in the West, Americans could not feel crowded, 
and they welcomed any additional aid that they might receive 
for their task of subduing their land.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Americans 
suddenly began to realize that their supply of land in the 
West was not inexhaustible. Throughout the 1880's and 1890's 
a wide variety of spokesmen warned the American public of the 
imminent disappearance of the nation's free public lands.
The famous prediction included in the 1890 census report, of 
course, and Frederick Jackson Turner's renowned 1893 essay on 
"The Significance of the Frontier in American History" were 
the most dramatic examples of this danger signal. But long 
before the 1890' s other Americans had begun to discuss the 
coming exhaustion of the Western lands and the ominous future 
that such a process could bring to the American republic.
With one of the factors that had created the nation's 
growth disappearing, many Americans of the late nineteenth 
century began to argue that the other-large-scale immigra- 
tion--could no longer be welcomed as a benefit to the country. 
With the continent subdued, with opportunities for homesteads 
in the West continually decreasing, some Americans suggested, 
further immigration could only be a burden. That the nation's 
first extensive campaign for immigration restriction occurred 
at the same time as the nation began to worry about the end 
of the frontier was more than coincidence. Although it was 
not the only or, by any means, the most significant factor 
in the drive for restriction, the belief in the exhaustion 
of the public lands provided a powerful impetus to the crusade 
for immigration restriction that arose in the late nine­
teenth century.
3
Lord Bryce, the British historian and politician and a 
perceptive observer of the American nation at the end of the 
nineteenth century, provided one of the more coherent discus­
sions of the way in which the disappearance of the frontier 
might affect American society. In his influential study of 
The American Commonwealth, first published in 1888, Bryce 
suggested that the United States possessed three great ad­
vantages that protected it from the problems disturbing 
Europe: a general lack of class distinctions; widespread
diffusion of wealth and property among the population; and 
relative freedom from poverty and economic distress, because 
of the abundance of economic opportunity in America, with 
"the still unoccupied or undeveloped West providing a safety 
valve available in times of depression."* But, Bryce warned, 
those advantages, and with them the security and prosperity 
of the United States, were threatened by two influences: the
increasing tide of immigration to America, and the impending 
exhaustion of the Western lands. Just as mysterious fog- 
banks endanger a ship in the ocean, Bryce observed, the coming 
exhaustion of the public lands presented to America "a time 
of mists and shadows, wherein dangers may lie concealed whose 
form and magnitude she can scarcely yet conjecture." The
*James Bryce, The American Commonwealth (2nd ed., rev.;




disappearance of the nation's best land would lead to a rise 
in food prices and a harsher struggle for existence; more 
significantly, it would end the outlet for population that 
the West had provided, drive people more and more into cit­
ies, and there increase the problems of labor competition 
and pauperism, "In fact," Bryce declared, "the chronic 
evils and problems of old societies and crowded countries,
such as we see them to-day in Europe, will have reappeared
3on this new soil."
Bryce also noted in his monumental work that the West 
had always been the part of the United States most free from 
the corruptions of Europe, and that immigrants who settled 
in the West, through a continual process of isolation and 
hard work, shed their old customs and ties and became more 
attached to American society. But as the frontier dis­
appeared, that process, too, was threatened. According to 
Bryce, the final exhaustion of the public lands might not 
occur for another thirty years, but when it did come a huge 
series of problems would beset the United States: "It will
cbe a time of trial for democratic institutions."
Lord Bryce was only one of the many authors who, in the 
last two decades of the nineteenth century, called attention 





He was not, furthermore, an active participant in the cam­
paign for immigration restriction. His brief reference to 
the closing of the frontier in The American Commonwealth, 
however, is significant because it demonstrates all of the 
major themes that tied the exhaustion of the public lands 
to the cause of restriction. Not only did Bryce connect 
immigration and land exhaustion as the two factors threat­
ening American institutions, but he also described specif­
ically how the two factors intertwined. The disappearance 
of the frontier ended the possibility of rural settlement 
on cheap homesteads for immigrants, and drove them into 
cities. It removed America's traditional labor safety valve, 
and meant that immigrant labor competition would lower Amer­
ican wages. Finally, it eliminated the pioneering life by 
which immigrants had been assimilated into true American 
society. These themes were reiterated continually throughout 
the 1880's and 1890's by many Americans who claimed that the 
closing of the frontier provided one reason for an immediate 
reduction in immigration to the United States.
The belief in the disappearance of the frontier and the 
campaign for immigration restriction appeared at--and were 
themselves a product of--a time of profound psychological 
crisis for the United States. In the 1880's and 1890's 
Americans sensed that the values and ideals that they had 
always cherished suddenly were dissolving within a flood 
of change.
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There is in all the past [wrote Henry George 
in 1883] nothing to compare with the rapid 
changes now going on in the civilized world 
. . . .  And that the rapid changes now going 
on are bringing up problems that demand most 
earnest attention may be seen on every hand.
Symptoms of danger, premonitions of violence, 
are appearing all over the civilized world.
Creeds are dying, beliefs are changing; the , 
old forces of conservatism are melting away.
Americans had always believed that theirs was a society of 
prosperity and opportunity, but in the late nineteenth cen­
tury they felt the effects of large-scale depression, partic­
ularly in the years after 1893, and they witnessed mass 
unemployment, poverty, and slum conditions in the cities.
They had always believed that their society was free from 
the class conflict that plagued Europe, but in the 18801 s 
and 1890*s they fearfully watched the growing strength of 
trade unionism, felt the bitter attacks of Henry George and 
Thorstein Veblen, and noted the rising discontent of im­
poverished farmers. They had always maintained faith in 
the perfection of their democratic institutions, but now they 
saw those institutions mocked by urban boss governments and 
threatened by the appearance of socialists and anarchists. 
They had believed that America could be a land free from 
violent industrial labor conflicts, but suddenly they heard 
of the railroad strikes of 1877, the Haymarket Square riot 
of 1886, the Homestead Strike of 1892, the Pullman Strike of
Henry George, Social Problems, in The Complete Works 
of Henry George, II (New York: Doubleday Page and Company7 
'1904), pp^ 6-/7
7
1894, and dozens of other examples of labor unrest. In 1894 
Americans even had to consider the meaning of an '‘army" of 
some five hundred men, led by the reformer Jacob S. Coxey, 
marching upon the Capitol of the United States and demanding 
federal relief programs to combat the depression. The psy­
chological impact of all this on Americans was devastating, 
and produced at the end of the nineteenth century what one
historian has called a transition period from an age of con-
7fidence to an age of doubt.
The most basic aspect of the rising mood of doubt in the 
United States was the country’s rapid transformation into an 
urban-industrial society, with all of the dislocations pre­
sented by such a change. Industrialization meant that the 
old Jeffersonian concept of a nation of yeoman farmers no 
longer could apply to the United States, By 1890 American
Qindustry produced more wealth than did American farms, and 
the urban-industrial future of the country had become a fact. 
Americans increasingly were leaving their farms and heading 
for jobs in the cities. Moreover, those farmers who remained 
were by no means prosperous, contented Jeffersonian yeomen. 
They were improverished and oppressed by the forces of agri­
cultural depression and the vagaries of a new world-wide
?Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind: An Interpreta­
tion of American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), pp. 47-48. See, Tn par­
ticular, all of Chapter II: pp. 41-54.
^Gilbert C. Fite, The Farmers' Frontier 1865-1900 (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 223-224.
s
agrarian market, and their discontent coalesced into polit­
ical demands for basic changes in the American economic and 
social structure.
The doctrine of the closing of the frontier conformed 
perfectly to the general mood of doubt in the late nineteenth 
century, and the statements of Turner and others received a 
wide hearing among the American public. Indeed, the fear of 
the exhaustion of the public lands was a- basic part of the ' 
transition from an agrarian nation to an urban-industrial 
society.
Although it is by no means true that the frontier simply 
ended in the 1890's--in 190G there were still some 560 million
Qacres of land available under federal land laws --most of the 
better, more arable lands of the West had fallen into private 
hands by that time. More significantly, Americans of the late 
nineteenth century sincerely believed that their frontier was 
disappearing, and the belief profoundly frightened them. The 
closing of the frontier would bring to Americans final proof 
that their agrarian democracy was evaporating, and that the 
renowned pioneer spirit was vanishing from the United States. 
Accordingly, many Americans in the 1880's and 1890's desper­
ately sought ways by which they could alleviate the distress 
that must face the nation when the frontier was gone.
QE. Louise Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain; 
Disposal and Reservation Policies 1900-50 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 3-4.
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Such a goal involved, in one direction, a search for new 
frontiers to conquer. This could take the form, domestically, 
of active participation in the "strenuous life" advocated by 
Theodore Roosevelt or, internationally, of seeking foreign 
markets for American industry and t r a d e . I n  another direc­
tion, it involved a search for new measures by which the 
United States could preserve the virtues that formerly the 
frontier had provided. The pioneer life, Americans believed, 
had always promoted democracy, individualism, nationalism, 
and the formation of a composite American character. With 
the frontier gone, new and more artificial means of protect­
ing those qualities Had to be devised, such as an additional
lOFor contemporary suggestions of the need to open up new 
frontiers through overseas expansion, see Josiah Strong, Ex­
pansion Under New World-Conditions (New York: The Baker and 
Taylor Company, 1900), pp. 27-43; and Frank Norris, "The Frontier 
Gone at Last," The World's Work, III (February, 1902), pp. 1728- 
1731. Walter LaFeber has shown that American expansionism of 
the 1890’s was not a sudden effect of the closing of the fron­
tier, but rather the culmination of the foreign policy and in­
dustrial transformation of the entire post-Civil War period. 
According to LaFeber, the industrial revolution in the second 
half of the nineteenth century brought to America an era of 
economic surplus, depressions, and labor violence, and the 
United States tried to solve these social and economic prob­
lems through a policy of foreign expansion. This was not ex­
pansion in terms of a colonial empire, but rather an economic 
expansion based on a need to acquire new markets for America's 
industrial surpluses. LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpreta­
tion of American Expansion 1860-T8§& (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1963), pp. 1-61, 407-417. Although LaFeber 
denies that there was any direct cause-and-effect relationship 
between the closing of the frontier and the expansionism of 
the 1890's, he does agree that Americans of the period be­
lieved that there was a connection: "But there can be no doubt 
that one important part of the rationale for an expansive 
foreign policy in the 1890's was a fervent (though erroneous) 
belief held by many American [sic] that their unique and benei- 
icient internal frontier no longer existed." Ibid., p. 64.
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and more positive role for government in guaranteeing equality 
of opportunity. Another means by which the old frontier 
characteristics could be preserved, many Americans announced, 
was to eliminate one of the forces that now threatened those 
characteristics: immigration.
Immigrants, many Americans believed, had become more of 
a threat to American institutions with the frontier disappear­
ing, because they contributed to most of the problems connected 
with the loss of the public lands. With Western homesteads 
unavailable, immigrants crowded into cities and increased the 
problems of crime, pauperism, and corrupt urban governments. 
With the Western safety valve gone, immigrants had to seek jobs 
in Eastern factories, where they competed with native-born 
workers, drove down wages, and aroused labor discontent.
Their radical and socialist views, Americans claimed, promoted 
unionism, strikes, and labor violence. Furthermore, the immi- 
grants--especially the newer ones from southern and eastern 
Europe--did not assimilate into American society, largely be­
cause the Americanization process provided by the frontier had 
vanished. With these fears in mind, leading Americans of the 
late nineteenth century found that the closing of the frontier 
provided a potent reason for halting further immigration.
In the 1880's and 1890's, then, two general fears--those 
produced by the increasing tide of immigration and by the loss 
of the public domain--combined in a drive to restrict European 
immigration. This aspect of the movement for restriction dom­
11
inated the period roughly from 1882, when Congress passed 
the first general law regulating immigration, to 1897, when 
President Cleveland vetoed a bill designed to reduce immigra­
tion substantially by means of a literacy test. During that 
period the fears caused by the closing of the frontier were 
most immediate and most influential in the American mind.
During that time, leading American restrictionists--and 
three men in particular: Josiah Strong, Francis Amasa Walker,
and Richmond Mayo-Smith--made effective use of the frontier 
theme in their arguments against immigration. Large-scale 
restriction, of course, did not appear until Congress devised 
the quota system in the 1920*s. By that time, however, racial 
fears and the general mood of disillusionment following World 
War I were more important factors behind restriction. The 
frontier theme was most prominent in the campaign during the 
years when Americans believed that the frontier was disappear­
ing, at the end of the nineteenth century.
T.he closing of the frontier, obviously, was only one 
of the influences affecting anti-immigration sentiment in 
the 1880's and 1890's. Resentment of labor competition, fear 
of radicalism from abroad, the urban crisis, the huge increase 
in immigration following 1880, and especially prejudice against 
the "new" immigration all combined as important factors in the 
movement. It is, however, a significant fact that sentiment 
in favor of restriction rose to such a height in a period when 
Americans for the first time expressed anxiety about the loss
12
of their public lands, and the fear of the disappearance of 
the frontier permeated many of the arguments for restriction 
presented in the periodical literature of the era.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST FEAR: IMMIGRATION
"There is land enough in America for the inhabitants of 
all Europe," declared the politician and orator Edward Everett 
in a speech on immigration in 1852, a sentiment with which 
most Americans agreed for the following three decades.̂  The 
United States had, in fact, looked favorably upon immigration 
from the very beginning of its history as a nation; one of 
the grievances that the authors of the Declaration of Inde­
pendence had directed against the King of England had been 
that he obstructed the immigration of foreigners to the col­
onies. Resentment of immigrants had appeared at times in 
the early years of the republic, such as the prejudice against 
Irish Catholics in the 1830*s or the Know-Nothing movement in 
the 1850’s, but those incidents had resulted primarily from 
religious bias and were not, by any means, widespread and 
perdurable movements throughout the nation. Through the 
Civil War era and beyond, the country still believed in its 
obligation, as a haven of liberty, to welcome the oppressed 
masses of Europe, and it furthermore sought the assistance of
^■Quoted in Edith Abbott, Historical Aspects of the Immi­
gration Problem: Select Documents (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1926), p. 625.
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2immigrants in subduing the continent.
Americans often declared that immigrants supplied the 
muscle, while native-born citizens provided the "headwork," 
needed to develop the land. Immigrant labor aided in the 
construction of railroads and canals, provided needed man­
power in young industries, and supplied much of the unskilled 
labor that the country required. Above all, Americans wel­
comed the aid of immigrants in pushing the agricultural 
frontier further and further west. With a huge and nearly 
empty continent of arable lands, the nation accepted all 
the help that arrived at its shores.
It will be seen at once [an American declared 
in 1855] that we have plenty of land yet un­
occupied, and that there is no danger as yet 
of crowding one another . . . .  It is not sur­
prising that, while we have so much land, which 
it is utterly impossible for us to use or 
occupy, the crowded population of Europe should 
annually send off immense numbers to find a home 
in the western world, where there is so much 
room for them, and such ample accommodations.
We are glad that they come. We would welcome 
them and give them on our soil a free and happy 
home.3
The United States government, on the basis of similar senti­
ments, often encouraged immigration through the middle years 
of the century. In 1864 the Senate committee on agriculture
^For much of the material of this chapter, I am indebted 
to John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American 
Nativism 1860-1925 (2nd ecL; New York; Atheneum. 1965]: and 
Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: The Uni­
versity of Chicago Press, I960) . ”
3A. Woodbury, "The Moral of Statistics," New Englander. 
XIII (1855), pp. 189-191; quoted in Abbott, Historical Aspects 
of the Immigration Problem, p. 810.
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formally noted the benefits of immigration in developing the
4land and mineral resources of the nation, and in the same 
year the Republican party declared its support for an open 
immigration policy: "Foreign immigration which in the past
has added so much to the wealth, resources and increase of 
power to this nation’•-the asylum of the oppressed of all 
nations--should be fostered and encouraged by a liberal and 
just policy."5
Western states and territories, in particular, actively 
encouraged immigration throughout the 1860's and 18 70's.
Many states created immigration agencies to promote foreign 
settlement in their open agricultural areas. The agencies 
advertised widely in the East and in Europe, published maps 
and pamphlets to lure immigrants, and even sent representa­
tives abroad to stimulate migration. Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
and Iowa were especially successful in enticing settlers from 
Scandinavia and Germany, and states actually competed against 
one another for potential settlers. Western railroads, in 
addition, directed an extensive land promotion campaign toward 
immigrants. Not only did the railroad companies hope to sell 
the lands that they had acquired through federal land grants, 
but they also needed settlement along their western routes to 
provide future freight business. Accordingly, the railroad
^Quoted in ibid., pp. 346-348.
5Quoted in William S. Bernard, ed., American Immigration 
Policy: A Reappraisal (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat 
Press, 1950), p . 6.
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companies offered special long-term payment policies to immi­
grants who purchased their lands, and offered, as well, reduced 
passenger fares to those lands. Some companies even built 
churches and schools for new communities in the West in order 
to encourage settlement. Individual land speculators, West­
ern editors, and local boosters, along with the states and 
railroads, all energetically promoted immigrant settlement
of the West at a time when the frontier lands appeared to be 
6inexhaustible.
Most immigrants in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, it is true, did not settle as farmers in the West.
Many thousands of Britons, Scandinavians, and Germans did 
migrate to Midwestern agricultural areas, but other immigrant 
groups tended to congregate in the cities of the United States. 
Many immigrants of the period were unskilled workers, not 
farmers, and lacked the capital and knowledge necessary for 
agriculture in the West. A general sense of economic oppor­
tunity, not specifically the promise of free lands, had
7attracted them to America. Nineteenth-century Americans,
^Fite, The Farmers* Frontier, pp. 24-29; Jones, American 
Immigration, pp. 187-190. For a more extensive treatment of 
the efforts of Great Plains states to attract immigration, 
the roles of state immigration bureaus, and promotional ad­
vertising of this era, see David M. Emmons, Garden in the 
Grasslands: Boomer Literature of the Central Great Plains 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), pp. 50-59, 
99-127, and passim.
7Folke Dovring, "European Reactions to the Homestead 
Act," Journal of Economic History, XXII (December, 1962), 
pp. 462-464; Jones, American Immigration, pp. 210-216.
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however, did not always grasp such knowledge so readily 
available to twentieth-century historians. To them, immi­
grants were beneficial because they did appear to settle on 
Western farms and further the development of the continent. 
Moreover, immigrants who settled in the East often replaced 
American farmers who moved West, and in that way they con­
tributed to the general westward expansion of the nation.
During the 1860‘s and 1870*s, therefore, most Americans 
were confident of the material growth of their nation and 
regarded immigration as an aid to that growth. They actively 
encouraged immigration to the West, and maintained a faith
gin the assimilative powers of the nation as a melting pot.
By the beginning of the 1880’s, however, Americans began to 
question the long-accepted benefits of immigration. A con­
tinually growing tide of immigration, a rise in labor unionism 
and unrest, the growth of urban problems, and, above all, a 
change in the source of immigrants all combined to create, in 
the minds of Americans, a new and widespread fear of immigra­
tion.
Early in 1891 the superintendent of police in New Orleans 
was murdered. Suspicion immediately centered around the local
8Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 14-23. Higham notes 
that some materialistic Americans even assigned a monetary 
value of up to $1000 or more to each immigrant, as an indi­
cation of the value he brought to the nation: ibid.. p. 17.
See also Emmons, Garden in the Grasslands, pp. 47-50.
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community of Italian immigrants, many of whom were believed 
to have connections with a secret group known as the Mafia.
The local authorities brought several Italians to trial for 
the crime, but the jury refused to convict a single one.
The citizens of New Orleans suspected bribery, and decided 
that they would have to enforce justice themselves. On the 
night of March 14, 1891, a mob composed primarily of leading 
businessmen of the city burst into the prison where those 
accused of the crime were being held and lynched eleven 
Italians. The prison officials did nothing to stop the
deed, and the local press of New Orleans applauded the ac-
9tion.
Two months later, Representative Henry Cabot Lodge of 
Massachusetts, in an article for The North American Review, 
discussed the meaning of the incident for the American public. 
Lodge announced his disapproval of the mob action, of course, 
but declared that the real significance of the deed went far 
beyond the issue of a mere act of violence. Americans were 
a peaceful and law-abiding people, Lodge noted, and "such 
acts as the killing of these eleven Italians do not spring 
from nothing without reason or provocation." With a rather 
obscure bit of logic, Lodge proceeded to show that the immi­
grants had died because of the fact that they had been there; 
that is, their mere presence in the United States aroused 
uncontrollable fears and destroyed the normal lawful conscience
9Ibid., pp. 90-91; Henry Cabot Lodge, "Lynch Law and 
Unrestricted Immigration," The North American Review, CLII 
(May, 1891), pp. 602-612.
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of the American people. The existence, Lodge argued, of 
masses of illiterate and potentially criminal immigrants in 
American cities--classes of people who might possibly con­
tribute to the rise of such dangerous societies as the Mafia-- 
in itself undermined the system of local government in the 
United States, created widespread fear of violence and crime, 
threatened the American standard of living, and destroyed 
the natural equanimity of the American people. The blame 
for the Italians* deaths, Lodge observed, lay with the United
States government for allowing them to be in the country in
the first place.
I believe that, whatever the proximate causes of 
the shocking event at New Orleans may have been,
the underlying cause, and the one with which
alone the people of the United States can deal, 
is to be found in the utter carelessness with 
which we treat immigration to this country.
Lodge, therefore, demanded stricter controls over immigration
to prevent such scenes from occurring again.1®
Other Americans of the time saw the New Orleans incident 
as an argument for further restriction of immigration. "The 
New Orleans massacre of Italians has made more prominent than 
ever the question of restriction on immigration," noted E. L. 
Godkin in The Nation, and he went on to suggest that only 
immigrants who could speak English should be admitted to the 
United States.11 A writer in the Political Science Quarterly
IQlbid.
11[E. L. Godkin], "The Proper Sieve for Immigrants,"
The Nation, LII (April 16, 1891), p. 312.
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referred to the “disorder1* as “an alarm-bell'* that should
awake the nation to the dangers of a foreign population in
12its midst, and throughout the country the event contributed
13to a mood of anti-immigration hysteria.
The New Orleans incident, therefore, was not only sig­
nificant as one example of mob violence in the late nine­
teenth century; it was also an example of the pervasive 
fear of immigration that had appeared in the United States 
by the 1880's and 1890's. The episode dramatized the social, 
economic, and political fears by then held by Americans 
toward immigrants, and it furthermore indicated how those 
fears were most often directed against the “new** immigrants 
from the southern and eastern parts of Europe. By the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, more Americans than 
ever before opposed immigration; to them, it seemed that 
immigration now menaced the social, political, and moral 
stability of the republic.
Widespread fear of immigration began in an era when 
immigration to America had risen to proportions never before 
reached. By the 1880's vast improvements in communication 
and transportation, leading to cheaper and easier steamship 
travel across the ocean, provided greater opportunity for
12John Hawks Noble, “The Present State of the Immigra­
tion Question,'* Political Science Quarterly, VII (June, 1892), 
p. 232.
13Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 91-92.
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emigration from Europe. Instead of a crossing that took from
one to three months, steamships now made possible a ten-day
14voyage to America at any time of the year. Steamship com­
panies, competing with one another, actively promoted immi­
grant travel to the United States and offered attractive 
fares for a voyage to the land of opportunity. Americans 
of the time suddenly found themselves burdened with what 
they called "the great gulf-stream of humanity which sets 
from Europe upon America---the greatest migration of peoples 
since the world b e g a n . B e g i n n i n g  in the 1880*s, the sheer 
force of numbers from abroad frightened Americans.
Americans, however, were more afraid of what those num­
bers could mean to the future of American institutions. The 
arrival of hordes of immigrants aroused great fears concerning 
all aspects of American society. Economically, the immigrants
14Jones, American Immigration, pp. 183-185.
■^Henry George, Social Problems, p. 20. A special com­
mission created by Congress in 1891 to investigate the causes 
of immigration to the United States issued a lengthy, two- 
volume report of its findings. The five commissioners, re­
porting separately, disagreed somewhat on the major reasons 
for emigration from Europe, but all emphasized the general 
hope for a higher standard of living and increased economic 
opportunity. Some of the commissioners believed that immi­
grants usually decided to move through the letters and infor­
mation they received from friends and relatives already living 
in America. Other commissioners, however, emphasized the 
importance of steamship company promotion, contract labor 
agreements, and fraudulent advertising in enticing immigrants 
to the United States. U.S., Congress, House, A Report of the 
Commissioners of Immigration Upon the Causes Which Incite 
Immigration to the United States, House exec, doc. 235,
52nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1&52, Vol. I, pp. 120-123, 235-237,
248, 263, and passim.
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seemed to endanger the high standard of living and the bar­
gaining power long enjoyed by the American worker. "Immigra­
tion,'* wrote Richmond Mayo-Smith in 1888, "subjects the laborer 
of America to a stress of competition such as no laboring class
1 fin the world has ever been called upon to endure." Immi­
grant labor competition, Americans shouted, would end high 
wages in the United States.
Politically, Americans viewed mass immigration as a 
threat to democracy. Ignorant new voters, with no experience 
in or knowledge of the responsibilities of self-government, 
could overturn the American electoral system. Moreover, they 
could easily fall victim to the corrupt influences of dema­
gogues and urban bosses. "There is no corner of our system,"
E. L. Godkin argued, "in which the hastily made and ignorant 
foreign voter may not be found eating away the political
structure, like a white ant, with a group of natives standing
17over and encouraging him," Immigrants posed a further po­
litical threat, many Americans believed, because they often
brought with them anarchism, socialism, and other radical 
18doctrines.
l&Richmond Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration. IT," 
Political Science Quarterly, III (June, 1888), p. 223.
■^[E. L. Godkin], "The Harm of Immigration," The Nation, 
LVI (January 19, 1893), p. 43. For similar views of the po- 
litical fears aroused by immigrants, see Hjalmar H. Boyesen, 
"Dangers of Unrestricted Immigration," The Forum, III (July, 
1887), pp. 532-542; and Noble Canby, "Immigration," The 
Chautauquan, XVI (November, 1892), pp. 197-201.
18Although it was true that immigrants provided a high 
percentage of the trade union members and leaders in America,
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European immigration continues [Lord Bryce 
wrote] , and though more than two-thirds of 
the immigrants make valuable citizens, the 
remainder, many by their political ignorance 
and instability, some few by their proneness 
to embrace anti-social doctrines, are a source 
of danger to the community, lowering its tone, 
providing material for demagogues to work on, 
threatening outbreaks like those of Pennsyl­
vania in 1877, of Cincinnati in 1884, of 
Chicago in 1886.19
Mass immigration, the citizens of the United States began to
fear after 1880, menaced the political stability of the nation.
Socially, the immigrants aroused an even greater fear.
To a large extent, this was because of the way in which they 
congregated in the cities of the country. The immigrants 
lived by themselves in urban areas, organized by nationality, 
speaking their own languages, following their native customs, 
and refusing to become “Americans.'* They often established 
their own schools, churches, and newspapers. They lived in 
the most degraded slum conditions, and, Americans claimed, 
increased the levels of crime, poverty, disease, illiteracy, 
and insanity. Accordingly, they placed a financial burden upon 
the local taxpayers and endangered the security of the commun­
ity. But the greatest social fear, as one author indicated,
as well as many of the more radical leaders of the late nine­
teenth century, and although nativists always linked immigra­
tion with political radicalism, most immigrants were actually 
very conservative. Their European tradition of accepting the 
existing state of things, their loneliness and confusion in 
America, their fear of change and belief that change could 
only make matters worse, and their ties to the past and the 
ideals of their homeland all tended to make immigrants socially 
and politically conservative. See Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1951), pp. 108-110; and Jones, 
American Immigration, pp. 229-232.
19gryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 716.
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was the one based on the simple fact that the immigrants were 
‘•different": "The danger which threatens us is the growth of
a large foreign element in our population whose habits of
thought and behavior are radically different from those which
2 0the founders of the nation hoped to establish here," This 
fear arose in the 1880*5 and 1890*s directly in response to 
the so-called "new" immigration from southern and eastern 
Europe.
Americans had always been accustomed to an immigration 
consisting of the English, Germans, and Scandinavians--Anglo- 
Saxon peoples from the northern and western parts of Europe. 
Those immigrants had been similar in traditions, customs, and 
religions to the native-born citizens of the United States, 
and they had assimilated easily into American society. Amer­
icans could tolerate and welcome them readily; after a while, 
they found that they could tolerate even the Irish immigrants. 
Around 1880, however, driven by political and religious dis­
content and the economic dislocations caused by industrialism 
and agricultural depression, a rising tide of immigrants 
began arriving in the United States from such places as 
Austria, Hungary, Russia, Italy, Turkey, and Rumania. These 
"new" immigrants by no means replaced the older immigration 
from northern and western Europe, but they did appear in ever-
20Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question,"
p . 232.
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21increasing numbers throughout the 1880es and early 1890's.
The new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
frightened most Americans by the fact of their difference.
They were, in general, poorer and less educated than any class 
of immigrants who had come before them. They were, moreover, 
generally Roman Catholic or Jewish, thus arousing hostility in 
a Protestant nation. Furthermore, they seemed to aggravate all 
the political, economic, and social dangers that Americans as­
sociated with immigration. They were, for the most part, un­
skilled workers who increased labor competition and drove down 
wages. They were ignorant of democratic political institutions. 
They lived in crowded slum conditions in the nation's cities.
Above all, they looked different; they were not Anglo-Saxons,
22Americans claimed, they were members of a different race.
With the arrival of the new immigrants in the 1880's 
and 1890's, Americans began a storm of hysterical criticism. 
Senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, one of the
21For a convenient table of European immigration figures 
throughout United States history, see The Statistical History 
of the United States from Colonial Times to the Present 
(Stamford, Conn.: Fairfield Publishers, n.d.), pp. 56-57.
22Jones attacks the validity of the whole notion of a 
"new" immigration, claiming that these immigrants came in the 
same patterns and for the same reasons as all earlier waves of 
immigrants: American Immigration, pp. 3-5, 178-183, 192-193.
It is nevertheless true that native-born Americans of the late 
nineteenth century believed sincerely in the idea of a new im­
migration, and reacted on the basis of that belief. It is 
also true, from a historical viewpoint, that immigration from 
the nations of southern and eastern Europe did increase dras­
tically in the 1880's.
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earlier Congressional leaders in the restriction movement, 
complained that the nation was now receiving "the very worst 
class of immigrants. They are illiterate, coarse, and
stupid^-utterly unfit for residence or citizenship in the
23United States." Chandler’s colleague Henry Cabot Lodge 
made the issue his most consistent political theme in the 
late nineteenth century.2  ̂ Francis Amasa Walker, a leading 
lay spokesman for the cause of restriction, filled his writ­
ings with hostile references to the "shiftless peasants" and 
the "foul and stagnant pools of population" that were drain­
ing off from southern and eastern Europe into the United 
States. There was no reason, Walker exclaimed, why the 
country should have to accept persons who obviously repre­
sented "the utterest [sic] failures of civilization, the
worst defeats in the struggle for existence, the lowest
2 5degradation of human nature."
Countless others joined in the denunciations. A writer 
in The Chautauquan complained of "those nationalities in the 
south and eastern part of Europe which have not held their 
own in the race struggle" dominating the recent arrivals in 
the country. "These hordes are of an inferior type," he
23Wm. E-. Chandler, "Methods of Restricting Immigration," 
The Forum, XIII (March, 1892), p. 129.
2^See, e.g., Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Restriction of Immi­
gration," The North American Review, CLII (January, 1891), 
pp. 27-36.
^Francis Amasa Walker, "Immigration," The Yale Review. I 
(August, 1892), pp. 131-135; Walker, "Immigration and Degrada­
tion," The Forum, II (August, 1891), pp. 643-644.
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continued, "least capable of understanding our institutions,
or adapted to responding to the opportunities and privileges
7 6of a free government." The labor leader Terence V. Powderly 
agreed: "The population which came previous to 1860 was civi­
lized, that which comes to-day is, in a great proportion,
27semi-barbarous.” Everywhere Americans protested the fact 
that the new immigrants did not assimilate into Anglo-Saxon, 
Protestant society, claiming that the new immigration "is 
not related to us in race or language, but has habits of 
thought and behavior radically foreign to those which have 
so far prevailed in the United States. These facts are too
28potent to be missed and too significant to be disregarded."
Many Americans of the period did not disregard such 
"facts." The first of the great fears of the 1880’s and 
1890's--that of immigration--motivated many influential 
leaders to campaign for some type of control over the rising 
tide of immigrants, and resulted in the first series of 
federal laws restricting immigration.
Nativist sentiment, of course, to some extent had been 
present in America ever since the first wave of settlers began
26Canby, "Immigration," p. 199.
^T. V. Powderly, "A Menacing Irruption," The North 
American Review, CXLVII (August, 1888), p. 166.
OQ
[J. H. Noble], "The New Immigration," The Nation,
LIII (September 17, 1891), p. 210.
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to consider themselves true "AmericansBefore the 1880's, 
however, nativism specifically directed against immigration 
had reached significant proportions only sporadically. Most 
early forms of nativism, moreover, had appeared as part of 
fears that went beyond mere resentment of immigrants. The 
early colonial laws aimed at the restriction of some types 
of immigration had often stemmed from hostility toward re­
ligious and economic differences, not from any real race or 
nationality prejudice. In the 1790's, bitter political 
rivalries had influenced the passage of the Alien and Sedi­
tion Acts by the Federalists, measures designed in part to 
halt the admission of alleged alien radicals whom the Fed­
eralists feared. Antagonism directed against the Irish in 
the 1830's and 1840's had been largely a result of religious 
bias against Catholics and fears of a papal plot against 
American democracy. The Know-Nothing movement, which became 
powerful enough to control some states in the middle 1850's, 
had not called specifically for immigration restriction, but 
more for excluding immigrants from participating in politics. 
The movement, furthermore, disappeared quickly in the midst 
of the more significant sectional conflicts in the 1850's;
and, like all early nativist campaigns, it never really cap-
29tured the support of a majority of the American public.
By the 1880's, however, the increasing social, economic,
2 9Jones, American Immigration, pp. 39-176, passim.
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and political fears aroused by the new immigration, and the 
ever-expanding numbers of immigrants, produced a new wave 
of anti-immigration sentiment, and one that affected a siz­
able portion of the American public and that revealed 
specific demands for a federal restriction of immigration. 
Americans from varied backgrounds and interests began to 
agree on the necessity of reducing immigration. Labor leaders
and organizations campaigned against the labor competition
30that unrestricted immigration created. Urban reformers of 
the late nineteenth century resented the problems of poverty 
and crime that immigrants seemed to intensify in the cities. 
Protestants continued to alert the public to the growing 
strength of the Catholic church in America as immigrants 
swarmed to the country. Americans reacted hysterically to 
the labor violence of the late 1880's and 1890's by increas­
ing their demands for restriction of the immigrants who seemed 
to cause the conflicts. Above all else there were the racial 
fears against the new immigrants. What, in general, arose
from the tensions of the period was the first widespread and
31long-lasting American movement against immigration.
^American labor generally favored restriction of immi­
grants specifically induced to America as contract labor, be­
cause of its fear of competition. Because American unions, 
however, included so large a percentage of foreign-born members 
and leaders, labor usually opposed sweeping limitations on 
voluntary immigration: Higham, "Origins of Immigration Restric­
tion, 1882-1897: A Social Analysis," Mississippi Valley His­
torical Review, XXXIX (June, 1952), pp. 80-81.
31j©nes, American Immigration, pp. 252-258; Higham, 
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 78-84.
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The mood of fear created, in the 1880’s and 1890's, a
series of local and national nativist societies throughout
the United States. Many patriotic and fraternal organizations
began to endorse the principle of restriction. The American
Protective Association, founded in Clinton, Iowa, in 1887 by-
Henry F. Bowers, called for restriction of Catholics, but the
32group withered away by the late 1890's. More important and
influential was the Immigration Restriction League, organized
in 1894 by a group of young Boston Brahmins who resented the
rising power of foreign elements in America, their own loss
of status, and the weakening numerical strength of the Anglo-
Saxon race in New England. For twenty-five years the League
issued pamphlets, organized speeches, lobbied in Congress,
and in other ways campaigned vigorously for a reduction in 
33immigration.
The various restrictionists and their societies in the 
late nineteenth century announced their support for specific 
measures by which the nation could stop the flow of immigra­
tion, but there was never universal agreement upon what 
measures would be most effective. "There is an almost uni­
versal feeling in favor of greater restrictions than the 
law now imposes," declared Senator William E. Chandler in
32Jones, American Immigration, pp. 255-256.
33Barbara Miller Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A 
Changing New England Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1956), pp. 99-111 and passim.
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1893, "but there is no unanimity of opinion as to what the 
new restrictive measures should be."^ Chandler favored a 
system of consular certificates, whereby any prospective 
immigrant, before sailing to the United States, would obtain 
a certificate from an American consul attesting to his bene­
ficial qualities and character, and indicating that he would 
not place an additional burden upon the American taxpayers. 
Others proposed various types of head taxes, by which only
immigrants who could afford to pay a certain sum upon landing
3 3could settle in the United States. Others declared that
only those who could speak English should be admitted, since
3 6they could adapt easily to American political institutions.
A general test of literacy in any language became, in the 
1890's, probably the most popular idea regarding restriction.
Edward Bemis, a Johns Hopkins economist, first proposed the
37measure in 1888 in an article for the Andover Review. The 
Immigration Restriction League appropriated the idea and made 
it one of its basic campaign doctrines. Prescott F. Hall, 
an original founder and secretary of the League, declared that 
there was a distinct correlation between illiteracy and crime, 
poverty, and violence, so that the literacy test measure would
34W. E. Chandler, "Shall Immigration be Suspended?", The 
North American Review, CXLVI (January, 1893), p. 4.
35See, e.g., Walker, "Immigration," pp. 139-141.
3 6[Godkin], "The Proper Sieve for Immigrants," p. 312.
37Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, pp. 78-79,
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exclude easily all undesirable immigrants from the country.
Hall even suggested that the plan was a perfect one because
the Statue of Liberty held a torch in one hand and a book 
38in the other! For these and other similar measures, re- 
strictionists waged an extensive campaign at the end of the 
century.
Such a campaign implied that the federal government had 
the responsibility of enacting some type of controls over 
immigration, and by the late 1880’s immigration bills had 
become a frequent aspect of Congressional business. Immi­
gration restriction had become as well a major issue in po­
litical campaigns. In an 1891 survey of "The Political Issues 
of 1892,11 Henry Cabot Lodge noted that, along with silver 
coinage, the tariff, election reform and the civil service 
system, "there is, besides, a question of a widely different 
kind which ought perhaps to be considered in any enumeration 
of the probable issues of next year. This is the question 
of immigration." Lodge went on to suggest that the restric­
tion issue was receiving more and more attention and was
39becoming "the gravest subject before the American people."
By the 1890's restriction was a leading doctrine of the Repub­
lican party, with Senators Lodge and Chandler organizing the
38Prescott F. Hall, "Immigration and the Educational 
Test," The North American Review. CLXV (October, 1897), 
pp. 400-401. See also Noble, "The Present State of the 
Immigration Question," pp. 238-243.
3QHenry Cabot Lodge, "The Political Issues of 1892,"
The Forum, XII (September, 1891), pp. 104-105.
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campaign in Congress. The Democratic party in general was 
less enthusiastic about restriction, because it contained 
more foreign-born members, but in 1892 the Republicans, 
Democrats, and Populists all issued platform statements 
calling for some type of controls over immigration.40 In 
the closing years of the nineteenth century immigration 
restriction became a prominent social and political concern 
of a wide segment of the American public.
This concern about immigration, and the profound fears 
aroused by immigrants, produced in the 1880's and 1890*s the 
first significant series of federal immigration laws. The 
measures passed often proved ineffective, and they were only 
minor acts compared to the sweeping immigration laws of the 
twentieth century, but they were nevertheless an important 
indication of the dominant fears of the late nineteenth cen­
tury.
Although Congress had enacted a few measures concerning 
immigration earlier, the first general federal immigration 
law was passed in 1882.4 "̂ That act gave the Secretary of the
4 0Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion 
1890-1900 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 5.
4^For brief surveys of the immigration legislation of 
the 1880’s and 1890's, see Roy L. Garis, Immigration Restric­
tion (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1927), pp. 83-1161 r 
Marion T. Bennett, American Immigration Policies: A History 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), passim; and 
Bernard, ed., American Immigration Policy, pp. 1-21. Garis 
is generally in favor of restriction, Bernard calls for a
34
Treasury supervision over immigration, and excluded certain 
categories of immigrants from landing in the United States: 
convicts, idiots, paupers, lunatics, and all persons likely 
to become a public charge. The law of 1882 also decreed a 
fifty-cent duty on all aliens entering the country, with the 
money acquired to be used for the expenses of inspecting 
the immigrants and for a relief fund for some of the arrivals. 
The measure was a weak one, and proved almost impossible to 
enforce; an immigration inspector in New York, for example, 
was unable to determine immediately which immigrants might 
be paupers or likely to become public charges.^
Also in 1882 Congress passed the first Chinese exclusion 
act, the beginning of a series of measures aimed directly 
against oriental immigrants. Then in 1885, in an attempt 
to solve the problem of labor competition from European immi-
more liberal policy, while Bennett's work is simplistic and 
poorly written. Another survey of the early legislation can 
be found in a volume of the Dillingham Commission report:
U.S., Congress, Senate, Reports of the Immigration Commission: 
Immigration Legislation. S. Doc. 758, 61st Cong., 3rd Sess., 
19117 pp. 29-81. The latter work also reprints all the laws 
passed prior to 1911: pp. 95-126.
42A Congressional committee appointed in 1890 to inves­
tigate the effectiveness of the law of 1882 and other immi­
gration measures noted, in its report, that the port of New 
York had only five immigration clerks, who were so hurried 
in the inspection procedure that they could devote only 
thirty seconds of time to each immigrant. Under such con­
ditions, the committee declared, "it is manifest that the 
inspection is wholly inadequate." V. S., Congress, House, 
Report of the Select Committee on Immigration and Naturali­
zation, House report 34V2, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1891, 
p. iii.
35
grants, Congress passed the Foran Act, or the Contract Labor
t
Act. Enacted partly in response to demands from organized 
labor, the measure prohibited the importation of any alien 
already under a contract to work in the United States, and 
it voided all contracts, signed by aliens prior to their land­
ing. Exempted from the provisions of the law, however, were 
actors, singers, musicians, artists, domestic servants, and 
skilled workmen in new industries. Such exemptions, and the
general difficulty of proving that a prior contract may have
43existed, made the Foran Act nearly impossible to enforce.
The next major piece of immigration legislation was a 
law of 1891, which added new categories to the 1882 lists 
of excluded persons: polygamists and those "suffering from
a loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease." More impor­
tantly, the 1891 measure established a permanent federal 
administration in charge of immigration, and it created a 
series of federal inspection officers in all major American 
ports, thus allowing more vigorous enforcement of restric­
tion laws. The act also compelled steamship companies to 
return, at their own expense, all passengers rejected for 
admission by the inspection officers; this provision forced
the companies themselves to act as immigrant inspectors on
44the other side of the Atlantic.
43jones points out, in addition, that very few manufac- „ 
turers in the post-Civil War period had actively encouraged 
contract labor in the first place: American Immigration, 
pp. 190-191.
44Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 99-100.
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The measures of 1882, 1885, and 1891, even when properly 
enforced, excluded only a small percentage of the thousands 
of immigrants seeking entrance to the United States in the 
late nineteenth century.^ They did not, therefore, satisfy 
most of the spokesmen for restriction. In the 1890's the 
restrictionists began to band together in an extensive cam­
paign for a harsher law: the literacy test bill, which was
directed specifically at the "new" immigrants. Henry Cabot 
Lodge began promoting the idea as early as 1891, and in 1895 
he presented such a bill to the Senate. Lodge's bill would 
have prohibited all aliens over the age of fourteen who could 
not read and write some language from entering the country. 
Congress finally passed the measure in December, 1896, but 
President Cleveland vetoed the bill just before leaving 
office in 1897. Cleveland charged that the proposed law 
would keep out beneficial as well as undesirable immigrants, 
and he noted, furthermore, that the measure was inconsistent
with America's traditional image as a haven for the oppressed 
46of the world. Attempts to revive the literacy test bill 
were numerous throughout the early 1900's, but such a measure 
was not enacted until 1915. Immigration legislation in the
45The laws, in addition, could not stop excluded immi­
grants from entering the country across the Canadian border, 
where there was no system of inspection.
^Excerpts from Cleveland's veto message are reprinted 
in Edith Abbott, Immigration: Select Documents and Case 
Records (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), pp. 
198-201.
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1880's and 1890's, in general, remained diluted and sporadic.
The significant fact about the federal immigration leg­
islation of the 1880*s and 1890's, however, was that for the 
first time it existed. A rising fear of immigration in the 
late nineteenth century' contributed to the passage of federal 
restriction laws, and, more importantly, to a widespread 
public campaign against immigration.
American nativism, John Higham has suggested, always 
arose as a defensive form of nationalism, and only at times 
when Americans were losing confidence in some aspect of their 
way of life.^ When, in the 1880*s and 1890*s, tremendous 
new social, economic, and political pressures weakened Amer-
4
icans' confidence in their institutions, fear of immigration 
appeared. At the same time a second great fear grasped the 
attention of the nation: the impending exhaustion of the pub­
lic lands. When the two fears met, Americans began to ques­
tion seriously whether the right of immigration might not be 
"an abstract theory for whose sake we are sacrificing the
great advantage of our elbow-room and risking our national 
48character." The combination of the two fears threatened, 
both elbow-room and the national character, and that com­
bined threat could only serve to intensify the already-existing 
demands for immigration restriction.
^Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 4-5.
48Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question,"
p . 243.
CHAPTER III
THE SECOND FEAR: THE CLOSING OF THE FRONTIER
When Frederick Jackson Turner announced to the "World's 
Congress of Historians and Historical Students" assembled at 
the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1892 that "the frontier 
has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of 
American history,"1 he was not saying anything new. As Theo­
dore Roosevelt wrote to the young historian in 1894, Turner
actually had only "put into definite shape a good deal of
2thought which has been floating around rather loosely."
Turner clarified and popularized in an academic context the
^Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American His­
tory (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920, 1947), p. 38.
2Quoted in Ray Allen Billington, America's Frontier 
Heritage (Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1966), p. 13.
For a general discussion of the background to Turner's hy­
pothesis, see ibid.. pp. 4-13, as well as Billington, Fred­
erick Jackson Turner: Historian. Scholar. Teacher (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 108-131. Also valuable 
are James C. Malin, "Space and History: Reflections on the 
Closed-Space Doctrines of Turner and MacKinder and the Chal­
lenge of Those Ideas by the Air Age," Agricultural History, 
XVIII (April, 1944), pp. 65-74; Herman Clarence Mixon, 
"Precursors of Turner in the Interpretation of the American 
Frontier," South Atlantic Quarterly. XXVIII (January, 1929), 
pp. 83-89; and Lee Benson, Turner and Beard: American His­




importance of the frontier and its closing, but he admittedly
had appropriated many of his ideas from an already existing
body of opinion. The Italian economist Achille Loria had
demonstrated the importance of the availability of free land
to political institutions, and had suggested in the 1880's
that the future exhaustion of lands in the United States
3would lead to widespread social unrest. More importantly, 
large numbers of Americans themselves throughout the 1880's 
and 1890's had begun to express anxiety about the impending 
disappearance of the frontier. Their ideas had helped to 
create, in the late nineteenth century, a widespread American 
fear that the future of the United States was seriously 
threatened by the closing of the public domain.
A wide variety of Americans‘--government officials, re­
nowned authors, educators, private citizens--expressed their 
fears about the coming end of the frontier in the late nine­
teenth century, and the theme appeared frequently in the 
periodical literature of the era. As early as 1880 The Nation 
noted the danger: "The great progress of this country has 
taken place within the past twenty years, owing to the rapid 
settlement and cultivation of Western lands; and we have been 
going on as if there were to be no exhaustion of the impelling 
force." But, the editorial continued, the land was rapidly 
disappearing: "At the present rate of settlement the desir-
3Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, pp. 121-123; 
Benson, Turner and Beard, pp. l-4o.
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able free ’homestead' lands will probably all be occupied
before this decade has e n d e d . A  special Land Commission
Report of 1880 gave official notice to the idea.
It was estimated, June 30, 1879, that (exclu­
sive of certain lands in the Southern States) 
of lands over which the survey and disposition 
laws had been extended, lying in the West, the 
United States did not own, of arable agricul­
tural public lands, which could be cultivated 
without irrigation or other artificial appli­
ances, more than the area of the present State 
of Ohio, viz., 25,576,960 acres.5
A few years later Thomas Donaldson’s immense statistical
analysis of The Public Domain echoed the warning. There
was a large quantity of desert lands still available in the
West, Donaldson stated, and many lands suitable only for
mineral or timber use, but "the agricultural lands are now
about absorbed, and the movement westward in search of free
government lands must soon cease.
The fear mounted throughout the 1880’s. "It has never 
seemed to occur to [the nation] that a day would come when 
there would be no public domain to give away," announced a 
special reporter for The North American Review in 1886. But 
through ineffective land laws, through huge grants to rail-
^"An Agricultural Outlook," The Nation, XXXI (August 19, 
1880), p. 127.
^Quoted by Thomas P. Gill, "Landlordism in America,"
The North American Review, CXLII (January, 1886), p. 60.
^Thomas Donaldson, The Public Domain (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1884) , p. 27.
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roads and speculators, through a false optimistic belief
that the nation’s riches would last forever, the government
had squandered nearly all of its lands.
It is no longer a question of untold millions 
of acres of public domain. It is no longer a 
question for to-morrow, it is a question for 
to-day. The pressure has already come. For 
all practical purposes of bestowing free farms 
on its growing population, the public domain 
of the United States is now exhausted.7
One month later another writer in the same magazine repeated
the warning. "Considering the great wealth of public domain
which Uncle Sam had at the outset it is amazing to contemplate
the brief period in which he has squandered his estate," the
author noted. But, he went on, it was unfortunately true
that there were very few arable acres remaining in the West,
and it "seems clear that by the end of the century we shall
have no public lands open for cultivation." Both writers
were particularly concerned that many of the Western lands
had fallen into the hands of private speculators and absentee
landlords, thus raising the price of land, destroying the
ideal of a small homestead, and creating a landlord-tenant
system in the United States.
The notes of alarm continued into the early 1890's.
C. Wood Davis, writing in The Country Gentleman in 1891, 
asked what the closing of the frontier might mean to the 
nation.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ f
^Gill, "Landlordism in America," pp. 52-60; quotes from 
pp. 54, 60.
®A. J. Desmond, "America’s Land Question," The North 
American Review, CXLII (February, 1886), pp. 187, 138.
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When we reflect that the prime factor in the 
unexampled prosperity of the United States, 
and our comparative freedom from many of the 
social and economic problems long confronting 
Europe, has been the existence of an almost 
unlimited area of fertile land to which the 
unemployed could freely resort; that, prac­
tically, such lands are now fully occupied, 
and that such occupancy has occasioned a 
sudden halt in the westward movement of pop­
ulation at the line found to the extreme 
western limit of profitable agriculture, it 
may be well to inquire what changes are likely 
to result from the exhaustion of the tillable 
portion of the public domain.^
F. H. Newell, writing in Science in 1893, indicated that most
of the Western land suitable for agriculture had already been
appropriated: "At the present rate of disposal of public lands
it is a question of only a few years when every available acre
will be t a k e n . B y  the time of Turner’s famous essay, a
profound fear concerning the future of the nation without its
public lands already had arisen in the United States.^
Henry George was probably the most important writer of 
the 1880's to warn of the imminent exhaustion of the public
QQuoted in Benson, Turner and Beard, p. 80.
H. Newell, "Our Vacant Public Lands," Science, XXI 
CApril 14, 1893), p. 199. ““ “
^Not everyone believed that the closing of the frontier 
would be a disaster. C. Wood Davis, for example, thought 
that the exhaustion of the public lands would bring a rise 
in agricultural prices and prosperity, while J. Willis Gleed, 
a Kansas lawyer and real estate promoter, suggested in The 
Forum that land values would rise as the frontier disappeared: 
Benson, Turner and Beard, pp. 58-63, 65-66.
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domain. Land was the basic component of George’s entire 
economic theory, and to George the problem of the disappear­
ance of the public lands involved the rise of a landlord 
class who controlled those lands and the consequent division 
of American society into social classes. The dangers pre­
sented by the loss of the frontier, according to George, 
threatened the very stability of American civilization.
As early as 1871 George noticed that relatively little 
good, arable land remained free of private control in the 
United States. In Our Land and Land Policy he announced 
that if one deducted from the total acreage of the public 
domain the lands that had been lost through railroad grants, 
lands covered by water, mountains, and desert, and dry plains 
land unfit for agriculture, the nation contained only the
relatively small figure of 450 million acres of profitable 
12farm land. Accordingly, he warned, the public domain
could not last so long as the end of the century: MIn fact,
if we go ahead, disposing of it at the rate we are now doing,
it will not begin to last so long, and we may even count upon
our ten fingers the years beyond which our public lands will
13be hardly worth speaking of.”
The loss of the public domain was a tremendously serious 
matter to George, because he saw individual, privately-owned
12Henry George, Our Land and Land Policy, in The Complete 
Works of Henry George, VIII (New York: Doubleday Page and ~ 
Comp any, 19 0 4 j , p p . 3 - 5.
13Ibid. , p. 8.
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homesteads as a basic component of American society. In
his most celebrated work, Progress and Poverty, published
in 1880, George closely forecast Turner’s later remarks
about the role of frontier settlement as a determinant of
American character.
This public domain---the vast extent of land 
yet to be reduced to private possession, the 
enormous common to which the faces of the 
energetic were always turned, has been the 
great fact that, since the days when the first 
settlements began to fringe the Atlantic Coast, 
has formed our national character and colored 
our national thought . . . .  The General intel­
ligence, the general comfort, the active inven­
tion, the power of adaptation and assimilation, 
the free, independent spirit, the energy and 
hopefulness that have marked our people, are 
not causes, but results--they have sprung from 
our unfenced land. This public domain has 
been the transmuting force which has turned 
the thriftless, unambitious European peasant 
into the self-reliant Western farmer . . . .
All that we are proud of in the American char­
acter; all that makes our conditions and insti­
tutions better than those of older countries, 
we may trace to the fact that land has been 
cheap in the United States, because new soil 
has been open to the emigrant.14
Such a beneficial trait of -the frontier, George warned, would
disappear as all of the public lands passed into private
hands--especially into the hands of large speculators and
landowners. Already the best lands in the country had been
appropriated by the railroads and other private interests,
leaving only mountain and desert land available: "The great
fact which has been so potent is ceasing to be. The public
l^George, Progress and Poverty: An Inquiry into the 
Cause of Industrial Depressions and of Increase of Want with 
Increase of Wealth: The Remedy; Works, I. pp. 387-388. For 
a similar statement, see George, Social Problems, p. 21.
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domain is almost gone--a very few years will end its influ­
ence, already rapidly failing.
America’s most urgent problem, George therefore declared, 
was to eliminate land monopoly, an evil that became more 
sinister as the public lands disappeared. Land monopoly, he 
suggested, was the source of the widespread discrepancy in 
wealth in America, and of the problems of industrial depres­
sion as well. Since land was the ultimate source of all 
wealth, labor must have access to land in order to find 
opportunity and produce wealth. But land monopoly, particu­
larly that involving speculation, allowed much of America’s 
land to lie unused, and thus destroyed access to opportunity 
and upset the nation’s economy. The problem became more 
acute as the previously free lands of the West disappeared 
into private hands, eliminating access to wealth to an even 
greater extent.
George’s solution to the problem, of course, was a simple 
one: the single tax on land. The government should, in
effect, make land common property by abolishing all taxes 
except those on land values. This system would force land­
owners either to make profitable use of their land or to sell 
it to someone else who would; no one could afford to hold 
land idle for speculative purposes. The single tax thus would 
reinstate access to economic opportunity, and, in addition, 
overcome the difficulties presented by the loss of the public 
domain.
l^George, Progress and Poverty, pp. 388-389.
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Henry George, as a realistic observer, was not worried 
that all of the Western lands were about to be consumed. He 
only feared that they were being appropriated~-"fenced in”-- 
by private speculators, thus removing America’s traditional
1 f%unit of Western settlement, the cheap homestead. To George, 
as well as to many other Americans of the late nineteenth 
century, the final exhaustion of the free public lands seemed 
close at hand, and such a circumstance would occasion vast 
and unwelcome changes in the pattern of American society.
From a twentieth-century viewpoint, it is easy to demon­
strate that the frontier really did not close in 1890 or at 
any other time near the end of the nineteenth century. The 
nation actually disposed of more land under its homestead 
laws after 1890 than it did prior to that year, and in 1900
one-fourth of the entire country was still available under
17various land laws. It is, nevertheless, significant that 
a major portion of the arable homestead lands in the West--
■^See, e.g., Social Problems, pp. 24-25.
17Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, p. 2; Fred 
A. Shannon, "The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus," Amer­
ican Historical Review, XLI (July, 1936), pp. 637-651; Peffer, 
The Closing of the Public Domain, pp. 3-4. David Potter has 
further suggested that the closing of the frontier is a mean­
ingless concept, because as early as the middle of the nine­
teenth century urbanism and industrialism had replaced the 
frontier as the principal source of economic abundance in 
the United States: People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and 
the American Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1954) , pp. 158-160.
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lands that could be cultivated profitably without irriga­
tion-had been appropriated by the turn of the century. 
Mostly desert and mineral lands remained available under the 
nation's land laws in 1900, and the wild land rushes into 
Oklahoma in 1889 and the Cherokee strip in 1893 indicated 
that the public was feeling some type of land pressure by 
that time.^8
More important is the fact that many Americans of the 
late nineteenth century sincerely believed that their long- 
cherished frontier was passing. By the 1890's the pioneer 
life had practically entered into the realm of nostalgia, 
and Americans expressed deep anxiety about what such a 
condition meant to the future of their institutions. Many 
concluded that the loss of free lands had caused the depres­
sion of the 1890's, and could see only widespread poverty
19and unrest in a frontierless future.
The exhaustion of the public lands, therefore, was a 
real fear to Americans of the era. Predictions as to when 
the last acre of the public domain would disappear varied, 
but not widely. Lord Bryce gave the most optimistic esti­
mate in 1888, setting the date as "not more than thirty 
20years ahead." At the other extreme, The Nation declared
l^Fite, The Farmers' Frontier, pp. 215-216; Faulkner, 
Politics, Reform and Expansion, pp. 2-4; Peffer, The Clos­
ing of the Public Domain, pp. 3-4, 9.
19Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, pp. 108-109.
20Bryce, The American Commonwealth, II, p. 717.
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in 188 0 that the last arable homesteads would be taken up
by the end of the decade, and The North American Review
announced in 1886 that the frontier, for all practical
21purposes, had already perished. Henry George, Josiah 
Strong, and most other observers agreed that the end of 
the century would provide the magic date. To a large seg­
ment of the American public, the fear of the exhaustion of 
the Western lands was a real one and an ominously imminent 
one.
To Americans who fearfully pondered two of the prev­
alent fears of the late nineteenth century--the fear of 
immigration and the fear of the closing of the public 
domain---the two combined and pointed to an important assump­
tion. With America’s public lands disappearing, many rea­
soned, immigration must be restricted. A campaign against 
immigration would have materialized on its own in the 1880’s 
and 1890’s, simply as a result of the fears engendered by 
the "new" immigrants. But the closing of the frontier, 
occurring at the same time, intensified these fears and 
strengthened the restriction movement. Writers in leading 
periodicals of the era combined the two themes, and ex­
plained that the simple loss of space in the country, the 
disappearance of the frontier safety valve, and the end of 
the assimilative influences of the pioneering process all
21"An Agricultural Outlook," The Nation, p. 127; Gill, 
"Landlordism in America," p. 60.
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meant that the United States no longer could afford to admit 
a vast number of immigrants. The argument was an effective 
one to a public concerned about both of the fears.
chapter IV
RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS
To many of the spokesmen for immigration restriction, 
the impending exhaustion of the public lands provided a 
simple and direct reason for the necessity of reducing the 
flow of immigrants to the United States. The decline of 
open lands, obviously, indicated that the nation was nearly 
filled with settlers and no longer needed an artificial in­
crease in its population. With most of the arable lands of 
the West under cultivation, there was no further demand for 
able-bodied immigrant laborers and farmers to help push 
back the frontier and hasten the growth of America. The 
frontier had already been pushed back, and the nation now 
should preserve those few lands that remained for the use 
of its own native-born citizens.'1' The United States,
This theme was a predominant one in the attack on alien 
landownership, which, though not directly a part of the cam­
paign against immigration, showed some aspects of the connec­
tion between the loss of the frontier and hostility against 
foreigners. A letter-writer to the New York Tribune in 1881 
was one of the first to use this theme directly. Discussing 
the declining opportunities for American citizens in the late 
nineteenth century, he decried the fact that foreigners were 
grabbing too many of those opportunities, such as the remain­
ing land: "The nation has reached a point where its policy 
should be to preserve its heritage for coming generations, 
not to donate it to all the strangers we can induce to come 
among us." (New York Tribune, July 2, 1881, p. 5. Quoted 
in Higham, Strangers in the Land, p. 38.) Opposition to
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restrictionists claimed, no longer could afford to admit a 
stream of immigrants who could contribute only to the over­
crowding of the land.
All of those who argued for restriction agreed that in 
the earlier days of the republic immigration had been a 
benefit"-”in fact, a necessity--te the growth of the nation. 
In an 1891 article calling for restriction, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, at that time a representative from Massachusetts, 
heartily agreed that the earlier American policy of en­
couraging immigration had been “a wise and obvious course 
to pursue."
The natural growth of the people established 
in the thirteen colonies was not sufficient 
to occupy or develop the vast territory and 
valuable resources of the Union. We there­
fore opened our arms to the people of every 
land and invited them to come in, and when
alien landholding became increasingly vociferous through the 
1880‘s and early 1890*s, and alien landlords repeatedly were 
condemned as a major source of the rising system of tenant 
farming and other social problems of the West, (See espe­
cially George, Socla1 Problems, passim.) In 1887 Congress 
passed a .law forbidding aliens who did not declare an inten­
tion of becoming American citizens to purchase land in the 
Territories. In its report to the House of Representatives, 
the Committee on Public Lands strongly recommended the pas­
sage of the bill, announced that alien landownership was a 
perversion of the original intent of the Homestead Act, and 
indicated that the practice, if not halted, could cause the 
quick disappearance of the Western lands: “At the present rate 
of disposition this generation will see the last acre of pub­
lic land worth taking for a home by a farmer disposed of." 
(U.S., Congress, House, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., July 31, 1886, 
Congressional Record, XVII, pp. 7830-7831.) The act of 1887 
was aimed particularly at foreign absentee landlords who con­
trolled lands in the United States, but it was nevertheless 
part of the increasing concern about the role of foreigners 
in the disappearance of the frontier. A spokesman for re­
striction writing in 1890 noted the still-present concern of 
the West with alien purchase of lands, as well as further 
political demands for an end to the practice: Peri Ander,
“Our Foreign Immigration: Its Social Aspects," The Arena, II 
(August, 1890), p. 269.
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all the region beyond the Alleghanies, or 
even beyond the Mississippi, was still a 
wilderness, the general wisdom of this 
policy could not be gainsaid.
But, Lodge argued, the process of settling those vast lands
was now complete; a policy of unrestricted immigration must
now be considered harmful to the interests of the country.
We no longer have endless tracts of fertile 
land crying for settlement. Many parts of 
the United States, it is true, are still 
unsettled, and much of our territory is 
sparsely inhabited as compared to the stan­
dards of Europe. None the less, the condi­
tions have changed utterly from the days 
when the supply of vacant land was indefinite, 
the demand for labour almost unbounded, and 
the supply of people very limited. We have 
now a large population, the natural increase 
of which is quite sufficient to take up our 
unoccupied lands and develop our resources 
with due rapidity.2
To Lodge, as to most other proponents of restriction, it 
might have been true that some lands were still available 
in the West. But it was more important that those lands 
were rapidly disappearing, and the United States should 
initiate a policy of saving what remained for the use of 
native-born Americans. The nation, with its declining 
lands, no longer could afford to serve as the haven for the 
oppressed of the world, or as the hope of economic oppor­
tunity for a horde of immigrants from Europe. As one re- 
strictionist declared, such ideas were in the late nine­
teenth century only "vague and antique maxims" that applied
?Lodge, "The Restriction of Immigration," pp. 32-34.
S3
3when the nation was sparsely settled, but no longer.
The restrictionists feared the continuing influx of 
immigrants even more when they realized that the loss of 
the public lands meant that immigrants, with cheap farm 
lands no longer available to them, would flock into the 
nation's cities. The presence of large numbers of foreign- 
born residents in the cities of the East presented an 
awesome problem to Americans of the late nineteenth cen­
tury. Urban immigrants, the restrictionists claimed, lived 
in the midst of unbelievable poverty and squalor and in­
creased the problems of crime, vice, and pauperism in the 
cities. They were a source of labor competition, and drove 
down wages and the standard of living of native-born Amer­
icans. More importantly, they were a source of labor unrest, 
radicalism, socialism, anarchism, and other threats to the 
American political system. With these fears in mind, fears 
compounded by the closing of the frontier, restrictionists 
accelerated their demands for immigration reform.
One of the first persons to connect the loss of public 
lands and the consequent dangers of immigrants in cities was 
the statistician Worthington C. Ford, who mentioned the 
theme in an 1887 article for The Epoch. Like other restric­
tionists, Ford agreed that in previous eras, when a vast 
amount of unoccupied land was open to the immigrant settler, 
the nation could absorb easily the influx from abroad with-
^John Chetwood, Jr., "Immigration, Hard Times, and the 
Veto," The Arena. XVIII (December, 1897), p. 798.
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out danger to American institutions or prosperity. But 
now, Ford declared, the problem of immigration had become 
a vital one: "The exhaustion of the public domain has re­
moved one of the best openings for the foreigner who has 
no capital . . . [TJhe opportunities for the great mass 
of unskilled laborers . . . are becoming less, and this 
part of the immigration congregate in our cities, and, 
unable to obtain a living or to move westward, fill our 
charitable and penal institutions."^
Other restrictionists used the argument even more 
vehemently, with frequent bombastic allusions to the polit­
ical dangers of urban immigrants. A writer in The Forum, 
for example, declared that the disappearnce of profitable 
homestead iand was increasing the threats posed by the 
immigrants: "Our cities are filling up with a turbulent 
foreign proletariat, clamoring for panem et circenses, as 
in the days of ancient Rome, and threatening the existence 
of the republic if their demands remain unheeded."5 A 
few more realistic observers noted that the Western lands 
were not all filled as yet, but that the immigrants were 
crowding into the Eastern cities anyway. Representative 
Samuel W. McCall of Massachusetts, speaking before the 
House in favor of the proposed literacy test bill in 1896,
4Worthington C. Ford, "Regulating Immigration," The 
Epoch, I (April 15, 1887), pp. 229-230.
5Boyesen, "Dangers of Unrestricted Immigration," p. 533,
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answered opposing arguments that there was plenty of land 
still available for immigrants in Texas and other parts of 
the West.
The great difficulty is that this particular 
class of immigrants do not go to Texas, do 
not go to our unoccupied territory, but they 
settle down in our large cities, in our con­
gested districts. They add to the labor 
problems that are vexing them, and most of 
them go into the dangerous slums of our 
Eastern cities.6
To many restrictionists, however, it was, without a doubt, 
the pressure of the closing frontier that was driving the 
immigrants into the cities and increasing the problems of 
the nation. In the hands of effective restrictionists, the 
loss of the public lands was a powerful argument for a need 
to halt the flow of immigrants in the late nineteenth cen­
tury.
Three influential spokesmen of the period, in particular, 
used the frontier theme most effectively in awakening the 
American public to what they saw as a vital need for immi­
gration restriction. One of these men, the Reverend Josiah 
Strong, was enormously popular and influential with the 
general Protestant reading public of the United States. The 
other two--Francis Amasa Walker, a distinguished economist 
and the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech­
nology, and Richmond Mayo-Smith, a noted Columbia University
bu.S., Congress, House, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., May 20, 
1896, Congressional Record, XXVIII, p. 5477.
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political scientist-directed their appeals more often at 
the scientific and intellectual community of the nation. 
Together, these three men presented a powerful and dis­
tinguished front for the cause of restriction, and they 
influenced a major segment of the American public. All 
three used the frontier theme in their arguments against 
immigration, although in widely different ways. Their 
fears were based really on something much more important 
than the simple closing of the public lands, but in their 
use of the frontier theme they all began with the belief, 
as announced by o-ther spokesmen of the 1880’s and 1890’s, 
that the exhaustion of the public lands was imminent, and 
that such a danger provided a logical reason for a reduc­
tion in immigration.
To Josiah Strong (1847-1916), the West was of vital 
importance to the nation; indeed, the future of the West 
would decide the future of America, and even the future 
of mankind. The closing of the Western lands, obviously, 
would be a factor of grave significance in Strong’s scheme 
of things.
Strong had spent a relatively short part of his early 
career in the actual West. A native of Illinois and a 
graduate of Western Reserve College in Ohio, Strong with­
drew from Lane Theological Seminary in Cincinnati in 1871 
to accept a position as home missionary pastor of the Con­
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7gregational Church in Cheyenne, Wyoming. He lasted in 
that frontier community for only two years, trying to com­
bat the saloons, gambling halls, and "disreputable houses" 
of the town while guiding a church of some thirteen members. 
This short career in the West, however, profoundly influenced 
Strong, and was undoubtedly the source of many of his later 
throughts about the imperative need to save the West for 
Christianity.
In 1873 Strong returned to his alma mater, Western 
Reserve, as chaplain and instructor in theology. Two years 
later he accepted a pastorship in Sandusky, Ohio, and in 
the early 1880*5 he served as a regional secretary for the 
Congregational Home Missionary Society. In 1884 he became 
the pastor of a large Congregational church in Cincinnati, 
and it was while serving in that capacity that in 1885 he 
published his first major book, Our Country; Its Possible 
Future and Its Present Crisis. The book perfectly mirrored 
the thoughts of most nineteenth-century Protestant Americans,
7For information on the life of Strong, see John Haynes 
Holmes, "Josiah Strong,** Dictionary of American Biography. 
XVIII (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), pp. 150- 
151; Jurgen Herbst, editor’s introduction to Josiah Strong, 
Our Country (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1963), pp. xv-xvi; Dorothea Rosalie Muller, 
Josiah Strong and the Challenge of the City (Ph.D. disserta- 
tion, New York University, 1955; Ann Arbor,Mich.: University 
Microfilms, Inc., 1970), pp. 3-14; and Frank R. Grant, "The 
Kingdom of God and the Crisis of America: An Interpretation 
of Josiah Strong’s Thought’* (unpublished seminar paper, 
University of Montana, 1970), pp. 1-13.
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was an immediate bestseller, and made Strong a famous and
8influential figure for life. For the rest of his career 
Strong served as one of the most powerful spokesmen for 
applied Christianity and the social gospel movement, devot­
ing most of his time and attention to the problems of the 
industrial city. After the success of Our Country he went 
to New York as General Secretary for the Evangelical Alli­
ance of the United States, and later himself organized and 
directed other societies designed to combat problems of the 
new urban age, duties upon which he concentrated until his 
death in 1916. The American public, however, always knew - 
him mainly as the author of Our Country.
In many respects, the major theme of Our Country was
the significance to the nation of the coming exhaustion of
the Western lands, and Strong was one of the first major
writers of the late nineteenth century to tie that theme
9directly to the problem of immigration. To Strong, the 
West was the area in which the destiny of mankind would be 
determined within the coming decades. The late nineteenth 
century, he announced, was a momentous focal point in his-
8The first edition of the work sold at least 130,000 
copies, and numerous other editions were issued. Sections of 
the book were reprinted frequently in newspapers, magazines, 
and pamphlets, and the work was translated into several for­
eign languages: Herbst, editor’s introduction to Our Country. 
p. ix; Josiah Strong, preface to Our Country (rev. ed.; New 
York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1891), pp. 3-4.
9Higham says that the book was the first major attack 
on immigration since the 1850*s: Strangers in the Land, p. 39,
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tory, second in importance only to the birth of Christ, and 
an era that would determine the future of the human race.
Not only was the nineteenth century a time of dynamic changes 
in communications and transportation, but, more significantly,
it was the period in which the last New World--the American
IQWest— was being settled. As the world's final frontier, 
the lands of the West, according to Strong, could decide
man's fate. With its vast resources, the West would be the
1 1future home of millions. America held the future of all 
aspects of man's needs, from mining, manufacturing, and agri­
culture to the concerns of the spirit. The whole history of 
mankind had been a continual progressive westward, until in 
the closing years of the nineteenth century the movement had 
reached its final destination. "The West is to-day an 
infant," Strong warned, "but shall one day be a giant, in
each of whose limbs shall unite the strength of many na~
12tions." It was, therefore, a concern of the utmost impor­
tance that the American West, in its final years of settle­
ment, be furnished with the proper form of Christian civili-
^Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and 
Its Present Crisis (New York: The^American HomeMissionary7 
Society, 1885), pp. 1-7. Strong reiterated the importance 
of the late nineteenth century in most of his later works; 
see, e.g., The New Era, or The Coming Kingdom (New York: The 
Baker and Taylor Co., 1893), pp. 1-16.
■^Strong estimated that, with improvements in agricul­
ture, the arable lands of the West could feed as many as 
1,012,000,000 Americans! Our Country, p. 10.
12Ibid.t pp. 7-29. Quote from p. 29.
60
zation, which to Strong meant Anglo-Saxon Protestantism.
The future of the West, however, and therefore of the 
nation, was threatened by a number of sinister "perils" 
gathering in the closing years of the century. With a 
chapter devoted to each of them, Strong described in con­
siderable detail those perils, among them Romanism, Mormon- 
ism, intemperance, socialism, disparity of wealth, and the 
problems of the city. The one that he listed first, how­
ever, and one that profoundly increased the dangers of all
13the others, was the peril of immigration. An army twice 
as large as that of the Vandals and Goths who had destroyed 
Rome, Strong announced, in recent years had invaded the 
United States. This influx of immigrants seriously menaced 
the future of American civilization, as such a huge foreign 
element "must have a profound influence on our national life 
and character" and accelerate "several of the most noxious 
growths of our civilization."1  ̂ The immigrants, especially 
the typical "peasants" of the new immigration from southern 
and eastern Europe, would lower the standard of morality in 
the United States; they would increase the levels of disease, 
vice, and debauchery; and they would threaten the political 
institutions of the nation by falling prey to demagogues and 
city bosses. Moreover, immigrants could only increase the
1^Ibid., pp. 30-46. 
l 4Ibid., p. 40.
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dangers presented by the other perils of the era, Strong 
insisted. They added to the ranks of Catholics, Mormons, 
socialists, and anarchists* and they increased tremendously 
the problems of the urban slums. In short, immigration was 
the first threat to American civilization.
The threat posed by immigration, Strong went on to
announce, was even more serious because of the impending
loss of the public lands in the West. Based on the figures
of land sales in 1884, Strong calculated that all of the
arable lands in the West would be taken by the end of the 
15century, a problem that made the peril of immigration an
immediate one. For one thing, the end of the frontier would
drive the immigrants even more into cities (including the
new cities of the West), where they would increase the urban
problems to which they had contributed already.
If the growth of the city in the United States 
has been so rapid during this century, while 
many millions of acres were being settled, 
what may be expected when the settlement of 
the West has been completed? . . .  . When the 
public lands are all taken, immigration, though 
it will be considerably restricted thereby, will 
continue, and will crowd the cities more and 
more.1®
^Ibid., pp. 155-156. In a work published at the turn 
of the century, in 1900, Strong endorsed his own prediction: 
"Practically, therefore, our arable public lands are exhausted " 
Expansion Under New World-Conditions. pp. 19-21. In this 
work, Strong declared that the exhaustion of the lands was 
one of the new conditions that made necessary American eco­
nomic expansion abroad, especially to the tropics. For a 
discussion of Strong's views in the context of the expan­
sionism of the 1890's, see LaFeber, The New Empire, pp. 72-80.
■^Strong, Our Country, p. 137.
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More importantly, however, the potential settlement of immi­
grants in what few lands remained in the West, at a time 
when the West was to determine the destiny of mankind, posed 
a serious threat to Strong's plans for the West. The char­
acter of any community or area, he proclaimed, was decided by 
the character of its first settlers. With the West about to 
be settled permanently within the next fifteen to twenty years, 
the pioneers who migrated there would determine, "for cen­
turies to come," the destiny of the West and therefore of the 
17whole nation. To Strong, the problem reduced itself to a 
question of whether the West was to be Americanized or for- 
eignized, and to him the choice was an obvious one. The 
nation could not afford to watch a stream of immigrants, with 
their foreign religions, languages, and customs, populate the 
West. It should take steps to guard against the dangerous 
influx of foreigners, and make certain that the West was 
peopled by the proper civilization. To Strong, that civili­
zation meant Protestant members of the Anglo-Saxon race.
The Anglo-Saxon race, in Strong's view, represented man’s
purest ideals of both civil liberty and spiritual Christianity,
and that race, therefore, should be responsible for the civil-
18ization and evangelization of the world. God obviously had 
prepared the exhaustion of arable lands in the West as a means 
of increasing population pressure in the world. That pressure
17Ibid., pp. 144-158. 
18Ibid., pp. 159-163.
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would lead to "the final competition of races,” and from
that competition the superior Anglo-Saxon race, of course,
would emerge victorious. But as a means to that ultimate
victory, the Christians of the late nineteenth century should
open their eyes and realize the importance of settling the
West with the right kind of people--Protestant Anglo-Saxon
19Americans, not immigrants. With that important theme in 
mind, Strong then, in the closing chapter of his book, 
announced to his readers the ulterior motive that was actu­
ally behind the whole work: a plea for contributions to the 
Home Missionary Society, to help that organization bring the 
proper types of civilization and Christianity to the West.
To Josiah Strong, then, the closing of the frontier and 
the dangers of immigration combined to menace the future of 
Protestantism and the Anglo-Saxon race in America. Such a 
threat obviously necessitated some type of a halt to the flow 
of immigrants from Europe, especially those from southern and 
eastern Europe.
Francis Amasa Walker also feared the possible racial 
and social consequences of the influx of "new” immigrants-- 
his writings on restriction abound with hostile references 
to the "degraded peasants” finding their way to the United 
States. As a respected economist and educator, however, 
Walker was more concerned with showing that immigrants in
19Ibid., pp. 174-180.
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the late nineteenth century no longer (and perhaps never had) 
brought necessary benefits to the growth of the republic.
In demonstrations of this thesis, Walker made ample use of 
the theme of the closing of the frontier.
Walker (1840-1897) led one of those fascinatingly varied
lives that, seemed to be common to many members of the late
2 0nineteenth-century educated elite. He was a member of an 
old and distinguished New England family, the son of the 
well-known economist Amasa Walker. Francis Walker went to 
Amherst College at the age of fifteen, graduated in 1860, 
studied law for a brief time, and then entered the Union Army. 
By the age of twenty-five he was a brevet brigadier-general, 
and he won praise as an efficient officer who emphasized the 
necessity of precise military information. Wounded and im­
prisoned during the Civil War, with his health permanently 
weakened, Walker left the army in 1865 and for a few years 
taught Latin and Greek and wrote editorials for a Massachu­
setts newspaper. In 1869, his reputation for accurate 
statistical information apparently still alive in govern­
mental circles, Walker was appointed chief of the Federal 
Bureau of Statistics, a position he filled, either officially 
or unofficially, for the next several years. Conscientious
2 0For information on the life of Walker, see Jeannette 
P. Nichols, "Francis Amasa Walker," Dictionary of American 
Biography. XIX, pp. 342-344; George M. Fredrickson. The Inner 
Civil War (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), pp. 202-205; 
and Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, pp. 69-77.
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and thorough, Walker reorganized the bureau along more 
scientific lines, and as superintendent of the censuses 
of 1870 and 1880, he issued the most lengthy and precise 
census reports yet published, an accomplishment that greatly 
enhanced his reputation as a statistician. Following a 
brief term as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Walker in 
1872 accepted an appointment as professor of political 
economy at the new Sheffield Scientific School at Yale, 
although he still maintained his connections with the Bureau 
of Statistics until after the 1880 census. In 1881 he be­
came the second president of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, a position he retained for the rest of his life.
Walker was the author of several major works on eco­
nomics, and even though he criticized many of the established
laissez faire doctrines of late nineteenth-century conserva- 
21tism, he was considered the most prominent and influential
American economist of his time. His economic and statistical
theories relating to the development of the United States
have been identified as one of the influences on Turner's
22formulation of the frontier hypothesis, and his economic 
influence extended to Europe as well. As a distinguished
21-For a brief summary of Walker's economic views, see 
Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, 
III (New York: The Viking Press, 1949) , pp. 101-110.
2 2Billington, America's Frontier Heritage, pp. 9, 11; 
Fulmer Mood, "The Development of Frederick Jackson Turner 
as a Historical Thinker," Publications of the Colonial 
Society of Massachusetts. XXXIV, Transactions 1937-1942 
(Boston, 1943), pp. 306-307.
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statistician, economist, and educator, as a member of Boston 
Brahmin society who knew the right people and belonged to 
the right clubs, Walker was one of the most respected mem­
bers of the educational community of the era. His position 
of respected leadership can perhaps best be indicated by
the fact that he received more honorary degress than any
23other American of his time.
A man so honored undoubtedly would command great influ­
ence as a spokesman for the cause of immigration restric­
tion, a cause to which Walker devoted much of his attention 
in the 1880’s and 1890's. Like many other members of the 
Brahmin aristocracy, Walker strongly believed that the immi­
grants severely threatened the influence and status of his 
class, and he repeatedly called for an end to unrestricted 
immigration. His major contribution to the campaign was to 
demonstrate, in a statistical and scientific manner, that 
immigration no longer could be considered a social and eco­
nomic benefit to the nation, a major factor of this conclu­
sion being the loss of the public lands.
Walker actually tried to show that immigration had never 
been a blessing to the United States. Rejecting the tradi­
tional theory that immigrants previously had supplied man­
power when the country needed it, Walker, in an 1891 article 
for The Forum,announced a radical new theory that he
^Fredrickson, The Inner Civil War, p. 203.
2^Walker, "Immigration and Degradation," pp. 634-644.
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continually emphasized for the rest of his life. Using de­
tailed statistical information, Walker “proved" that immigra­
tion had contributed neither to the population increase, nor 
the economic growth, of the nation in the nineteenth century.
He delcared that the birth rate of native-born Americans, 
which had always been a high one, decreased drastically begin­
ning around 1830 when large-scale immigration first became a 
noticeable factor in the United States. The low birth rate 
of native-born Americans then had remained in effect ever 
since that time. Walker could only conclude that the influx 
of foreigners, with their low standards of living, decency, 
and morality and their added competition in the labor market,
"constituted a shock to the principle of population among the
2 5native element." In other words, terrified by the arrival 
of "stagnant pools of European population, representing the 
utterest [sic] failures of civilization, the worst defeats in
? Athe struggle for existence," native-born Americans stopped
reproducing at the rate to which they had been accustomed.
As a result, the immigration of the nineteenth century had
not added to the American population; it had merely replaced
native stock that otherwise would have appeared. Consequently,
Walker could not consider even the earlier immigrants as eco-
27nomic benefits to the country.
2^Ibid., p. 640.
26Ibid., p. 644.
27For a contemporary attack on Walker's theory, see 
[E. L. Godkin], "The Harm of Immigration," The Nation, LVI 
(January 19, 1893), p. 43.
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To a public that generally believed that immigration had, 
at least in the early years of the republic, provided some 
kind of a service to the nation’s growth, Walker’s argument 
could not be accepted completely. Consequently, in many of 
his other articles on immigration, Walker conceded that 
immigration possibly could have been desirable in earlier 
times. But, he emphasized, the conditions of the late nine­
teenth century, and particularly the disappearance of the
frontier, had now ended whatever need for immigrants might
28have existed previously.
’’There was a time,” Walker declared in an 1892 article
for The Yale Review, ”a long time, when every able-bodied
man coming to our shores, however poor and even however
ignorant, if not vicious or criminal, brought or added
strength to the young nation.”
The more came [he went on], the more there 
was for all and for each. A continent was 
to be wrested from savage nature, was to be 
annexed, occupied, cultivated, and every 
one’s help was welcome in the great work.29
But around the middle of the nineteenth century, Walker con­
tinued, Americans began to question the usefulness of immi-
28Walker used this theme directly in "Immigration," The 
Yale Review. I (August, 1892), pp. 125-145; and "Restriction 
of Immigration," Atlantic Monthly. LXXVII (June, 1896), 
pp. 822-829. For another article in which Walker emphasized 
the changing conditions of the nineteenth century, but not the 
frontier theme specifically, see "The Tide of Economic 
Thought," Publications of the American Economic Association.
VI, Nos. 1 and 2 (January-March, 1891), pp. 15-38.
29Walker, "Immigration," p. 126.
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gration. Even more recently, Americans became seriously 
alarmed by the influx of immigrants. The earlier belief in 
immigration as a source of wealth and power could apply no 
longer in an era witnessing the loss of the public lands in 
the West.
A generation or less ago, a vast extent of 
free public lands offered to every new-comer 
a home and a farm simply for the seeking. So 
wide was the range of possible settlement that 
the immigrant could scarcely go astray in his 
seeking. If not here, then there, lands of 
excellent quality and easy of cultivation lay 
open to his choice . . . .  To-day, the tracts 
of public land worth taking up under the home­
stead and preemption acts are few and far 
between. The crazy rush and the frenzied 
struggles which attended the opening of the 
Territory of Oklahoma, a few years ago, and 
the opening of the Cherokee Reservation within 
the past twelve months, afford striking testi­
mony to the difference between the new and the 
old state of things.30
Walker then announced his agreement with the prevalent fear 
of the loss of the frontier forcing immigrants into the na­
tion's cities: "Exhaustion of the free public lands makes 
the resort to the soil far more difficult and costly; and 
is having a marked effect in retaining an increased propor­
tion of the new arrivals at the very ports of entry or in
sending them to swell the operative populations of our man-
31ufacturing towns."
Walker repeated his use of the frontier argument in 
similar, but even more forceful, terms in an 1896 article in 
the Atlantic Monthly. Of the major new conditions that
3°Ibid., pp. 129-130. 
31lbid., p. 130.
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necessitated a more restrictive immigration policy in the
United States, he listed in first position the loss of the
public domain.
First, we have the important fact of the com­
plete exhaustion of the free public lands of 
the United States. Fifty years ago, thirty 
years ago, vast tracts of arable land were 
open to every person arriving on our shores, 
under the Preemption Act, or later, the Home­
stead Act. A good farm of one hundred and 
sixty acres could be had at the minimum price 
of $1.25 an acre, or for merely the fees of 
registration. Under these circumstances it 
was a very simple matter to dispose of a large 
immigration. To-day there is not a good farm 
within the limits of the United States which 
is to be had under either of these acts.32
The only possible solution to this problem, according to 
Walker, was a drastic reduction in the number of immigrants 
admitted. His favorite plan for accomplishing this task in­
volved a deposit of one hundred dollars to be paid by each 
immigrant upon entering the United States. If, after a 
period of three years, the immigrant had demonstrated that
he was a self-supporting, law-abiding citizen, the govern-
33ment would refund his deposit.
The important point to Walker was that such a policy 
would prevent the poorer and degraded peasants from southern 
and eastern Europe from coming to the United States, but not 
the more prosperous (and Anglo-Saxon) immigrants from Sweden, 
Norway, and Germany.3  ̂ Walker, in fact, was really much more
32Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," p. 826. 
33wal.ker, "Immigration," pp. 139-141.
34lbid,
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afraid of the "new11 immigrants, “shiftless peasants'* who 
threatened American social, political, and industrial insti­
tutions, than he was of the consequences of the closing of 
35the frontier. He did believe, nevertheless, that the loss 
of the public lands was one of the most important reasons for 
the need to restrict immigration, and in the hands of such a 
distinguished member of the academic community, the frontier 
argument provided an especially powerful weapon against immi­
gration.
Another distinguished political economist and educator 
of the period, Richmond Mayo-Smith, presented probably the 
most rational and least inflammatory appeals for immigration 
restriction in the 1880's and 1890's, Like the other major 
restrictionists, Mayo-Smith made effective use of the notion 
of the closing of the public lands, although on a much more 
perceptive level than either Strong or Walker.
In contrast to Walker's wide range of activities and 
careers, Richmond Mayo-Smith (1854-1901) led the duller,
T £
commonplace life of a typical college professor. Descended 
from seventeenth-century New England settlers, he was born 
in Troy, Ohio, and grew up in Dayton. As a member of a family
35For an example of Walker's racial prejudices, see 
ibid., pp. 130-135.
•^Information on Mayo-Smith's life comes from William 
R. Leonard, “Richmond Mayo-Smith," Dictionary of American 
Biography. XII, pp. 467-468; and Solomon, Ancestors and 
Immigrants, pp. 77-78.
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who held traditional New England values, he naturally went 
to college in New England, graduating from Amherst in 1875. 
After two years of studying economics at German universities, 
he began to teach political science at Columbia, where he 
remained for the rest of his life. His economic views, as 
well as his ideas on statistics and immigration, were influ­
enced by Walker. Mayo-Smith became widely respected in the 
academic community as an authority on economics and statis­
tics, and was the author of various works on those subjects.
He was one of the original editors of the Political Science 
Quarterly, founded at Columbia in 1886, and he frequently 
contributed to that publication. After such a lackluster 
and scholarly life, Mayo-Smith finally managed to make the 
front page of the New York Times in 19G1 when he jumped to 
his death from the window of his fourth-floor study. Oddly 
enough, he was on his sabbatical at the time.^
As a spokesman for immigration restriction, Mayo-Smith
showed much less of an emphasis on racial fears than did
either Strong or Walker. He definitely was disturbed by
the masses of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe,
as almost all Americans in that era were, and he was admittedly
3 8hostile to Chinese immigrants and American Negroes. But he
37“Columbia Professor Killed by a Fall,” New York Times, 
November 12, 1901, p. 1.
38See, e.g., Emigration and Immigration: A Study in 
Social Science CNew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904), 
pp. 64-65, 247-248. The work was originally published in 
1890.
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did not dwell on those racial fears as did many other re- 
strictionists of the late nineteenth century. Instead, 
Mayo-Smith emphasized the social and economic aspects of 
immigration, the results of increasing labor competition 
and the threat that the immigrants posed to the American 
standard of living. The closing of the frontier provided 
one major ingredient to his discussion of such topics.
Mayo-Smith*s first major contribution to the literature
of restriction, and his first use of the frontier theme,
came in a three-part article that he wrote for the Political
39Science Quarterly in 1888. Like other restrictionists,
Mayo-Smith agreed that immigration had been a benefit to
the young United States, a welcome addition to the labor
force of an under-populated and expanding nation.
The whole history of this country, of course, 
has been one of colonization and immigration.
The original need was for labor . . . .  The 
task which lay before the original settlers 
was immense. There was in front of them to
be subdued a wilderness three thousand miles
wide, covered with primeval forest, unbroken 
by roads and even u n e x p l o r e d . 40
The natural increase of American population alone could not 
have supplied the manpower necessary to conquer that wilder­
ness in a short period of time, so "that with our immense
unoccupied territory almost any addition to our population
was useful in developing our resources and was to be wel-
39Richmond Mayo-Smith, '’Control of Immigration," Polit- 
ical Science Quarterly, III, part I (March, 1888), pp. "4b-77; 
part II (June, 1888), pp. 197-225; part III (September, 1888), 
pp. 409-424,
40Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration, I," pp. 46-47.
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corned."^ But in the final years of the nineteenth century,
such conditions no longer applied.
The first work of the pioneer has been done 
and will never have to be done again. We 
have not brought all our land under cultiva­
tion, but we have taken up the better part 
of it, and there is no reason why we should 
desire to cultivate that inferior part which 
will make a less return for the labor.42
With the most arable public lands already under cultivation,
4 3and with population density increasing in the United States, 
there was no longer a need for immigrants. When added to the 
problems caused by the lack of assimilation on the part of 
the "new" immigrants and the effect of immigration on the 
social and political institutions of the nation, this factor 
could lead only to the conclusion of a need for some type of 
restriction.
Mayo-Smith again touched upon the frontier theme in his 
major work on the topic, Emigration and Immigration, published 
in 1890. He reiterated his belief that not all of the Western 
lands had been settled, but that most of the productive ones 
had, and he again emphasized the idea that the benefits of 
immigration could no longer be assumed in an era in which 
the valuable public lands had disappeared.*^ Again, the loss
41-Mayo-Smith,, "Control of Immigration, II," p. 198.
4*Ibid., p. 219.
43Mayo-Smith produced a statistical chart to demonstrate 
the increasing population density as the lands were settled 
more and more: "Control of Immigration. I," p. 52n.
44Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, pp. 96-97, 119.
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of the frontier provided a convincing argument against 
further immigration.
The frontier argument, however, meant much more to 
Mayo-Smith than a simple statement of the closing of the 
public lands. As a rational economist and political scien­
tist, Mayo-Smith was more concerned with the loss of the 
frontier as a safety valve for immigrant laborers, and with 
the loss of the pioneering process as a means of assimilat­
ing and Americanizing the masses of foreigners in the 
United States. His major use of the frontier theme involved 
those more advanced elements of the problem of immigration 
and the closing of the Western lands.
In itself, however, the simple fact of the impending 
loss of the public lands in the West was a direct motivating 
force behind the drive for immigration restriction in the 
late nineteenth century. By the middle of the 1890's, eco­
nomic depression and the collapse of the agricultural fron­
tier strongly intensified the campaign. Even Western con­
gressmen were voting for restriction by that time, arid the 
Western states had eliminated their earlier promotion of 
immigration.46 When also applied to the themes of the safety
46Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 73-74; Higham, 
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 86-87. For indi­
cation of declining Western encouragement of immigration in 
the 1890's, see "Immigration, Past and Present," The Review 
of Reviews. Ill (July, 1891), pp. 571-572; and Chetwood, 
"Immigration, Hard Times, and the Veto," p. 795.
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valve and the Americanization process, the belief in the 
disappearance of the frontier was an even more powerful 
incentive for restriction.
CHAPTER V
RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF THE SAFETY VALVE
The writers who demanded immigration restriction in the 
1880's and 1890's emphasized the closing of the frontier in 
a special argument aimed at the social and economic fears 
of the American public. The restrictionists claimed that 
the exhaustion of the public lands signaled the end of the 
protection traditionally offered to American economic insti­
tutions by the frontier as a safety valve. With the safety 
valve gone, they suggested, immigrants no longer could take 
up farms in the West; they instead would crowd into the in­
dustrial cities of the East. There, they would not only 
increase the burdens of crime and pauperism, but, more im­
portantly, they would compete with native-born workers for 
jobs and drive down the wages and standard of living of the 
American working class. A large urban population of for­
eigners, furthermore, would increase trade unionism and 
labor unrest in the United States, the restrictionists 
claimed, and would raise the threat of socialism and anar­
chism. The flood of immigrants, then, combined with the 
loss of the safety valve, constituted a grave threat to 
American society. This argument was another effective one
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used by many of the opponents of immigration.
Americans traditionally had believed that the frontier 
served as a safety valve, with the cheap lands of the West 
providing economic opportunity to all and draining off in­
dustrial workers from the East to Western farms. In this 
way, Americans claimed, the frontier safety valve reduced 
labor competition in the East, maintained wages at a high 
level, eased depressions by providing an outlet for unem­
ployed workers, prevented class consciousness and labor 
unrest, and generally destroyed social and economic ten­
sions in the United States. The frontier, therefore, served 
as the stabilizing force for the American republic.1
Belief in the safety valve began practically with the
settlement of the continent. Turner found a 1634 statement
by Governor Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay Colony indicating
that the availability of lands in New England caused settlers
2to neglect their trades. The safety valve was a basic 
tenet-: of Jeffersonian agrarianism; Jefferson himself in 
1805 wrote to a friend that the Western lands would prevent 
the rise of a large discontented laboring class in the young 
republic.
1The best general discussions of the safety valve theory 
are to be found in Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American 
West as Symbol and Myth (New York: Vintage Books, 195 7) , pp. 
201-210; and Billington, America's Frontier Heritage, pp. 29- 
38.
2Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 62.
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As yet our manufacturers [industrial workers] 
are as much at their ease, as independent and 
moral as our agricultural inhabitants, and 
they will continue so as long as there are 
vacant lands for them to resort to; because 
whenever it shall be attempted by the other 
classes to reduce them to the minimum of sub­
sistence, they will quit their trades and go 
to laboring the earth.3
Throughout the nineteenth century Americans continued to pay 
homage to the values of their safety valve. Horace Greeley 
often emphasized the theme in his New York Tribune, and en­
couraged Eastern workers to move west in order to relieve 
the suffering caused by the Panic of 1837.^ Europeans as 
well praised the safety valve as the factor that prevented 
unrest in America. The famous English historian Thomas B. 
Macauley indicated his views on the safety valve in a letter 
to an American friend in 1857: "As long as you have a bound­
less extent of fertile and unoccupied land, your laboring 
population will be far more at ease than the laboring pop­
ulation of the Old World, and, while that is the case the 
Jefferson politics may continue to exist without causing 
any fatal calamity."^ The safety valve doctrine was a major 
impetus behind the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, and,
3Jefferson, Writings, edited by Andrew A. Lipscomb 
(20 vols.; Washington, 1903-1904), XI, p. 55. Quoted in 
Smith, Virgin Land, p. 203.
4Smith, ibid., pp. 201-202.
Ĝ. 0. Trevelyan, The Life and Letters of Lord Macauley 
(New York, 1909), II, pp. 451-454. Quoted by Nixon, "Pre­
cursors of Turner in the Interpretation of the American Fron­
tier," p. 84.
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Americans believed, provided part of the reason for the suc­
cess of American democracy. Turner, in a 1903 article for 
the Atlantic Monthly, summarized the traditional concept of 
the safety valve’s contribution to American stability and 
freedom. The free lands in the West, he said, made the 
American ideal of opportunity real: "Whenever social condi­
tions tended to crystallize in the East, whenever capital 
tended to press upon labor or political restraints to impede 
the freedom of the mass, there was this gate of escape to 
the free conditions of the frontier."^
An important corollary of the safety valve theory was
that the free lands of the West provided a safety valve for 
immigrants as well as for American workers, thus preventing 
the foreign-born from flocking into the cities. "Hearty 
young laboring men" from abroad could easily purchase the 
cheap lands of the United States, and become prosperous 
farmers instead of city workers, Benjamin Franklin announced 
as early as the 1780’s: "Multitudes of poor people from Eng­
land, Ireland, Scotland, and Germany have by this means in a 
few years, become wealthy farmers who, in their own countries, 
where all the lands are fully occupied and the wages of labor 
low, could never have emerged from the poor condition wherein 
they were born." Even Alexander Hamilton, the principal
6Turner, The Frontier in American History, p. 259.
7Quoted by Joseph Schafer, "Was the West a Safety Valve 
for Labor?," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV 
(December, 1937), p. 300”.
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spokesman for the future of industrialism in the young re­
public, agreed in his 1790 Report on Manufactures that the 
Western lands would attract immigrants away from the Eastern 
factories.
The desire of being an independent proprietor 
of land is founded on such strong principles 
in the human breast, that where the opportunity 
of becoming so is as great as it is in the 
United States, the proportion will be small of 
those whose situations would otherwise lead to 
it, who would be diverted from it to manufac­
tures. And it is highly probable . . . that 
the accessions of foreigners who, originally 
drawn over by manufacturing views, would after­
wards abandon them for agricultural, would be 
more than an equivalent for those of our citi- g 
zens who might happen to be detached from them.
Alexis de Tocqueville supported this sentiment in Democracy in 
America: "No power on earth can close upon the immigrant that
fertile wilderness which offers resources to all industry and
a refuge from all want." After the passage of the Homestead 
Act, Americans believed that the West provided sufficient farm­
land for both the native-born and the foreign-born, and set­
tlers lauded that fact in a song they sang on the way west in 
the 1870's.
Come along, come along, make no delay,
Come from every nation, come from every way;
Our lands are broad enough, don't be alarmed,
For Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm.
8Ibid., p. 301.
^Quoted by Charles Stewart Smith, "Our National Dumping- 
Grounds: A Study of Immigration," The North American Review, 
CLIV (April, 1892), p. 433. “
^Quoted by Eric Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny (rev. 
ed. ; New York: Vintage Books, 1955) , p. 2Z~.
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Until Uncle Sam started to run out of farms in the 1880's 
and 1890’s, most Americans believed that the frontier pro­
vided an ample safety valve for all immigrants who came to 
the nation's shores.
Twentieth-century historians, of course, have demon­
strated that the safety valve theory was a myth. As a sig­
nificant means of attracting workers and immigrants from the 
East, the frontier safety valve never operated. Laborers 
from the East simply did not go west in any appreciable
For the principal twentieth-century attacks on the 
safety valve theory, see Murray Kane, "Some Considerations 
on the Safety Valve Doctrine," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXIII (September, 1936), pp. 169-188; Fred A. Shannon, 
"The Homestead Act and the Labor Surplus," American Historical 
Review, XLI (July, 1936), pp. 637-651; Shannon, "A Post-Mortem 
on the Labor-Safety-Valve Theory," Agricultural History, XIX 
(January, 1945), pp. 31-37; Clarence H. Danhof, "Farm-Making 
Costs and the 'Safety Valve': 1850-60," Journal of Political 
Economy, XLIX (June, 1941), pp. 317-359; Henry M. Littlefield, 
"Has the Safety Valve Come Back to Life?," Agricultural His­
tory. XXXVIII (January, 1964), pp. 47-49; Carter Goodrich and 
Sol Davison, "The Wage-Earner in the Westward Movement," Polit­
ical Science Quarterly, L (June, 1935), pp. 161-185, and LI 
(March, 1936), pp. 61-116; and Smith, Virgin Land, pp. 201- 
210. For articles defending certain aspects of the safety 
valve, see George G. S. Murphy and Arnold Zellner, "Sequential 
Growth, the Labor-Safety-Valve Doctrine and the Development of 
American Unionism," Journal of Economic History, XIX (Septem­
ber, 1959), pp. 402-421; Norman J. Simler, "The Safety-Valve 
Doctrine Re-Evaluated," Agricultural History, XXXII (October, 
1958), pp. 250-257; Ellen von Nardroff, "The American Frontier 
as a Safety Valve--The Life, Death, Reincarnation, and Justi­
fication of a Theory," Agricultural History, XXXVI (July, 1962), 
pp. 123-142; and three articles by Joseph Schafer: "Was the 
West a Safety Valve for Labor?," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXIV (December, 1937), pp. 299-314; "Some Facts Bear­
ing on the Safety-Valve Theory," Wisconsin Magazine of History, 
XX (December, 1936), pp. 216-232; and "Concerning the Frontier 
as Safety Valve," Political Science Quarterly, LII (September, 
1937), pp. 407-420.
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numbers in the nineteenth century. For one thing, they did 
not have the capital necessary to purchase lands, buy live­
stock and farm equipment, and transport their families to 
1 2the frontier. More importantly, Eastern workers lacked the 
skill and knowledge of agriculture necessary for one to be­
come a prosperous farmer. Furthermore, historical evidence 
indicates that workers remained in Eastern cities in times of 
depression, and migrated to other areas only when times were 
prosperous, contrary to the basic suppositions of the safety 
valve. Nor did the safety valve prevent labor unrest as it 
was expected to do, because there were, in the 1870's and 
1880's, many examples of violent labor conflict in the United 
States. There may have been a few workers who did settle upon 
Western farms, but their number was not significant enough to
justify the presence of an actual frontier safety valve.
1
Immigrants, moreover, did not settle on Western farms in 
any appreciable numbers in the nineteenth century. Many thou­
sands of Germans and Scandinavians, it is true, did settle on 
Midwestern homesteads, but the vast majority of the immigrants-- 
especially the "new" immigrants--went into cities even when 
frontier land was available. Like American workers, they 
lacked the money, skill, and knowledge necessary to become 
Western farmers. They had come to America with a vague hope 
for economic improvement, but with no specific hopes for an
12See, especially, Danhof, "Farm-Making Costs and the 
'Safety Valve'," pp. 317-359.
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13isolated rural farm. As a general rule, the frontier did 
not act as a safety valve for the immigrants in the nineteenth 
century.
This historical evidence, however, does not contradict 
the pervasive belief in the West as a safety valve in the 
nineteenth century. The fact is that almost all Americans 
of that era sincerely believed that the frontier always had 
served as a safety valve, and they had no historians proving 
to them that they were wrong.^ The notion was accepted and 
unquestioned at the time.
This pervasive belief in the safety valve meant that 
Americans would fear seriously the loss of that means of pro­
tection when the public lands disappeared. As early as 1838 
a United States Congressman had questioned the future effect 
on the nation when the safety valve evaporated.
Whenever labor has found itself straitened by 
population exceeding the ready means of subsis­
tence, it has found a safe and abundant refuge 
in the mighty wilds of the West. So long as 
this resource exists, the free systems of Gov­
ernment in the Northern States may endure . . . .
13Dovring, "European Reactions to the Homestead Act," 
pp. 462-464; Jones, American Immigration, pp. 210-216.
14Some recent historians have indicated that the prevalent 
strength of the safety valve myth may have created what they 
call a "socio-psychological safety valve." That is, even though 
Eastern workers hardly ever moved to a farm in the West, they 
always believed that they could if their conditions became 
desperate enough. In this way, the socio-psychological safety 
valve lowered labor discontent and unrest. See Billington, 
America^ Frontier Heritage, pp. 32-38; and Nardroff, "The 
American Frontier as a Safety Valve," pp. 123-142.
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But the time will come,--is rapidly approach­
ing, when the way to the West will be blocked 
up. Population will increase there, too, and 
diminish the price of labor . . . .  What, then, 
will become of the Republican forms of Govern­
ment in the Northern States [?]^^
When, in the 1880’s and 1890’s, the loss of the public domain 
and its safety valve appeared imminent, Americans became 
anxious about the future of their prosperity and their polit­
ical stability. One way by which the effects of this danger 
could be minimized, the restrictionists claimed, would be to 
reduce immigration.
The restrictionists who used the safety valve theme 
emphasized that the crowding of the immigrants into cities, 
because of the loss of the frontier, would create labor com­
petition, reduce the level of wages, and promote the rise of 
socialism and labor conflict. Such predictions were designed 
to--and did--arouse the direct, personal fears of the American 
people. Josiah Strong was again one of the first to employ 
this argument, with a brief reference to the passing of the 
safety valve in Our Country in 1885, Strong mentioned a com­
mon fear of the era, that with crowded urban conditions and 
labor unrest, the United States would lose its unique pros­
perity and fall victim to the problems besetting the Old World.
■^U.S., Congress, House, Representative R. B. Rhett of 
South Carolina speaking for the independent treasury bill,
25th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 25, 1838, Congressional Globe, 
appendix, p. 506.
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The rapid accumulation of our wealth, our com­
parative immunity from the consequences of un­
scientific legislation, our financial elasticity, 
our high wages, the general welfare and content­
ment of the people hitherto have all been due, 
in very large measure, to an abundance of cheap 
land. When the supply is exhausted, we shall 
enter upon a new era, and shall more rapidly 
approximate European conditions of life.
Now, Strong announced, those public lands were nearly gone, 
and the loss of that traditional safety valve would threaten 
the American political system: ''After our agricultural land 
is all occupied, as it will be a few years hence, our agri­
cultural population, which is one of the great sheet-anchors
of society against the socialistic current, will increase but
little, while great manufacturing and mining towns will go on
17multiplying and to multiply." As the major source of the 
"socialistic current," immigrants would be an even more impor­
tant danger to the country once the safety valve was gone.
This fact, according to Strong, provided a further reason for 
the necessity of protecting America against an invasion of 
immigrants.
Although it was not one of his major concerns, Francis 
Amasa Walker also touched upon the safety valve theme in his 
argument for restriction. As an economist, Walker heartily 
agreed that the safety valve had been of vital significance 
to America's high level of wages, as he pointed out in one 
of his scholarly works.
^Strong, Our Country, p. 153. 
17Ibid., p. 108.
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It has been the competition of the farm with 
the shop which has, from the first, most effect­
ually retarded the growth of manufactures in 
the United States . . . .
Now, the mode of living on the part of the 
agricultural population has necessarily set a 
minimum standard of wages for mechanical labor.
With an abundance of cheap land, with a popu­
lation facile to the last degree in making
change of avocation and of residence, few able- 
bodied men are likely to be drawn into factories 
and shops on terms which imply a meaner sub­
sistence than that secured in the cultivation 
of the soil.1**
But the loss of such a system of protection meant, to Walker,
the rise of labor competition and unrest, a fact only com­
pounded by the presence of masses of immigrants driven into 
the cities. In the same article in which he called for a 
one-hundred-dollar deposit from all foreign arrivals in the 
United States in order to decrease immigration, Walker ex­
plained how immigration and the loss of the safety valve 
combined to endanger the nation.
With, on one side, the resort to the land now 
become more difficult and costly, and, on the 
other, with declining wages in the harvest 
field, it would be surprising, indeed, if the 
more intelligent of the labor-leaders did not 
look with apprehension upon the spectacle of 
five millions of foreigners and more added to 
our population within ten years. Reluctant as 
we may be to recognize it, a labor-problem is 
at last upon us. No longer can a continent 
of free virgin lands avert from us the social 
struggle which the old world has known so long 
and so painfully.
18Walker, Political Economy (2nd ed., rev.; New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1887), pp. 512-513.
1 QWalker, "Immigration,11 p. 130.
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The loss of the safety valve only increased the threat of 
urban immigrants leading the United States into a state of 
labor and class conflict. Such a danger, according to 
Walker, was another indication of the absolute need for 
restriction.
Richmond Mayo-Smith’s economics also included an accept­
ance of the safety valve doctrine, and he, too, applied the 
theory to the problem of immigration. As with his use of the 
simple fact of the exhaustion of the public lands, Mayo-Smith 
did not over-emphasize the safety valve theme, nor was it his 
principal concern in his campaign against immigration. It 
was, nevertheless, a factor of sufficient importance to be 
indicated, and in his major work Emigration and Immigration 
Mayo-Smith directed special attention toward the traditional 
importance of the safety valve in the West.
Few people realize how this abundance of land 
has simplified all social problems for us in 
this country. We have laughed at the fear of 
over-population,--that nightmare of the coun­
tries of Europe. There has always been room 
for the restless and energetic. When a man 
failed in the East he could go to the West.
When trade became unprofitable, a man could 
take to agriculture. Our public land has 
been our great safety-valve, relieving the 
pressure of economic distress and failure.
This enormous expansion has been due very 
largely to it.20
Such an abundance of lands, Mayo-Smith indicated, always had 
provided an outlet for immigrants, but, with the lands declin­
ing, the immigrants now were settling in the cities and 
threatening the social institutions of America. He stressed
20Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, pp. 56 -57 .
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such a fear in his 1888 series, of articles for the Political 
Science Quarterly. He contradicted the views of those who 
claimed that further immigration was needed to settle the 
public lands, pointing out that the better, more arable por­
tions of the public domain had already been appropriated and 
that the ‘'great safety valve*' was therefore disappearing.
With the lands vanishing at so rapid a rate, the nation should 
preserve those that remained for its own citizens: "This
great domain should perform the same service for future gen­
erations that it has already performed for the present. Be­
cause we have a valuable heritage, why should we divide it 
among strangers?" With the end of the safety valve approach­
ing, Mayo-Smith declared, the United States should make cer­
tain that the dangers posed by immigration were eliminated as
21soon as possible.
More rational and perceptive than most of the other re­
strictionists of his era, Mayo-Smith did not exaggerate the 
importance of the safety valve. At times, he even agreed 
that much of the Western land still remained open to settle­
ment. But, he pointed out in statements foreshadowing those 
of twentieth-century historians, the immigrants did not go to 
those lands.
One of the greatest misconceptions about this 
whole subject is, I believe, that all we have 
to do with this mass of immigrants is put them 
on the land "out West" and make farmers of
^Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration. Ill," pp. 417-418.
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them . . . .  Now the great mass of these 
laborers are not farmers at all or even farm 
laborers . . . .  They do not possess either 
the skill, or the capital, or the knowledge 
of modern methods and the use of agricultural 
machinery, requisite to enter into the ranks 
of the farmers of this c o u n t r y . 22
To Mayo-Smith, the safety valve was something to be saved for
Americans, but it was only one small segment of his argument
for immigration restriction. He was much more concerned with
the fact that the immigrants of the 1880’s, especially when
driven into the cities, did not assimilate into the American
culture.
The disappearance of the safety valve, along with the 
general disappearance of the frontier, became a factor of 
even greater concern to Americans with the rise of the agri­
cultural and economic depressions of the 1890’s, and it was
one of the many factors that intensified the drive for immi-
23gration restriction in that period. The rising flow of 
the immigrants into cities, it was claimed, threatened the 
traditional concepts of the republic, as well as its eco­
nomic stability. What really bothered the restrictionists, 
however, was the character of the new immigrants of the late 
nineteenth century, and the fact that, living in cities, they
^Mayo-Smith, ’’Control of Immigration. II," p. 217. See 
also Emigration and Immigration, pp. 115-116.
23p0r allusions to this theme in the 1890’s, see Canby, 
"Immigration,” p. 198; and Chetwood, Jr., "Immigration, Hard 
Times, and the Veto," pp. 795-796.
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did not assimilate into true Americans. The closing of the 
frontier provided the spokesmen for restriction with ammuni­
tion to use with this argument, too.
CHAPTER VI
RESTRICTION AND THE LOSS OF 
PIONEER AMERICANIZATION
The process of assimilation was the factor at the heart 
of the restrictionists1 fears of the new immigrants. As long 
as immigrants to the United States had adapted to the civili­
zation of the New World, as long as they had discarded their 
European habits and customs and become true ‘'Americans," the 
native-born inhabitants of the nation generally had accepted 
them. But in the 1880's and 1890's Americans discovered that 
the current group of immigrants, particularly those from 
southern and eastern Europe, did not "Americanize." They 
instead retained their European languages, dress, religions, 
and manners; they lived by themselves in isolated sections 
of the nation's cities, and even read their own foreign- 
language newspapers. This created, in effect, a group of 
foreign nations existing within the United States, the re­
strictionists said, and threatened the stability of the coun­
try: "The danger which threatens us is the growth of a
large foreign element in our population whose habits of 
thought and behavior are radically different from those 
which the founders of the nation hoped to establish
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here.
The problem of assimilation was a crucial one that was 
a part of a general American concern throughout the second 
half of the nineteenth century1’-the desire to create a ra­
cially homogeneous society. The goal of homogeneity was 
particularly a part of Republican ideology, and it was the 
Republican party that most often led the political campaign 
against immigration. From its beginnings in the 1850’s, 
the Republican party had sought a type of racial homogeneity 
in the United States, asserting, for example, that it was 
’’the white man's party" and trying to prevent the expansion 
of blacks into the territories. By the latter part of the 
century, the party’s ideology still included a goal of racial 
purity, directed not only against the future of blacks in
American society but against non-Anglo-Saxon immigrants as
?well. This ideology was a predominant one within the general 
American public in the 1880's and 1890's, and the rise of 
Darwinian thought in that era gave new respectability to the 
idea of racial conflict, the struggle for existence among 
racial groups, and the eventual establishment of a homogeneous
1-Noble, "The Present State of the Immigration Question," 
p. 232.
^George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind 
The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 18l7-1914 
(New York: Harper § Row, 19yi), pp. 130-147, 324. Fredrickson 
argument is concerned mainly with American antagonism against 
blacks in the nineteenth century, but his theories on the 
desire for racial homogeneity apply also to the prejudice 
against the new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
in the 1880’s and 1890's.
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3society. The late nineteenth century, therefore, witnessed 
an extensive desire for a completely white, Anglo-Saxon civ­
ilization in the United States, a goal that seemed thwarted 
by the increasing numbers of immigrants in the country. 
Immigrants, Americans believed, posed a more immediate threat 
because they no longer assimilated into that dominant American 
society. The restrictionists claimed that the loss of the 
frontier provided one reason why the immigrants no longer 
assimilated.
Americans traditionally had believed that the pioneering 
process had made a man, particularly a newcomer to the United 
States, more "American." By travelling to the Western parts 
of the continent, and thus removing himself as far as possible 
from the tainted conditions of the Old World; by struggling 
against the wilderness; by building his own house, creating 
a farm, and providing for his family; in short, by living the 
rugged life of a pioneer, a man attached himself to his new 
land and to the American nation. The independent farmer on 
the frontier, Americans declared, developed courage, inven­
tiveness, initiative, self-reliance, and all the other traits 
that supposedly made one a real American citizen. Pioneering, 
moreover, taught men the virtues of equality and democracy, 
and thus contributed to their worth as citizens of the repub­
lic. The frontier, therefore, as Lord Bryce declared, was 
"the most American part of America," an area in which constant
5Ibid., pp. 228-232.
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hard work made a man less of a European, and more of an Amer- 
4ican.
The belief that the availability of farmlands in the 
West would help to Americanize immigrants had been one of 
the forces behind the passage of the Homestead Act, as the 
debates that centered around that measure in the 1850's and 
1860*s indicated. Representative Cyrus L. Dunham of Indiana, 
arguing for an early homestead bill proposal in 1852, declared 
that free lands would prevent immigrants from crowding into 
cities and would, therefore, attach the immigrants more closely 
to the United States government: "There is something in the
nature of man which makes him cling to that spot of earth he 
can call his own, and to the government that protects him in 
its enjoyment."5 Representative Willard P. Hall of Missouri 
agreed.
If, by a system of legislation at once just and 
beneficial to our citizens generally, we can 
induce the foreign immigrant to make his home 
in the West, we secure his attachment and fidel­
ity to our institutions. As soon as he finds 
himself in possession of a home, and occupying 
a position that makes him a free man--free from 
the control, direction, and oppression of a 
superior, he will and must feel proud of Ameri­
can citizenship. He becomes identified with us 
in hopes, in interest, and feeling.^
Such a belief continued throughout the rest of the nineteenth
4Bryce, The American Commonwealth, p. 697.




century. Theodore Roosevelt, in his 1889 historical work on 
The Winning of the West, continually emphasized the American­
izing qualities of frontier life. Speaking of the early 
Alleghany frontier, for example, Roosevelt described how 
people from all nations fused into a unit under pioneer 
conditions: "A single generation, passed under the hard 
conditions of life in the wilderness, was enough to weld 
together into one people the representatives of these num­
erous and widely different races; and the children of the 
next generation became indistinguishable from one another."
The result, Roosevelt announced, was that foreigners became 
Americans "in speech, thought, and culture," and they "lost
all remembrance of Europe and all sympathy with things 
7European."
The Americanizing qualities of the frontier received 
their most famous praises in the writings of Frederick Jack­
son Turner in the 1890's and early 1900's. Turner, in his 
1893 essay on "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," stated the theme most directly: "The frontier is
the line of most rapid and effective Americanization." Be­
cause, according to Turner, life on the frontier brought a 
continual "return to primitive conditions," immigrants who 
moved West discarded their old customs and behavior traits 
and accepted new elements of civilization: "The advance of
the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influ-
^Theodore Roosevelt, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, 
National Edition (20 vols. ; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1 9 2 6 ) ,  V I I I ,  p. 89.
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ence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American
Olines.” Consequently, “a composite nationality for the 
American people” developed on the frontier from the diverse 
groups of people who moved there: ”In the crucible of the 
frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and 
fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor
Qcharacteristics.”
Turner reiterated the theme at greater length over the 
next decade in his articles for the Atlantic Monthly. Not 
only did the frontier Americanize the immigrant socially, 
he proposed, but it further promoted in the immigrant the 
ideals of American democracy. Pioneer life encouraged a 
belief in equality, individual liberty, and confidence in 
America, and gave the immigrant a faith "in the manifest 
destiny of his country.'1̂ ® The process occurred over and 
over again across the continent, molding each wave of set­
tlers into staunch American citizens.
European men, institutions, and ideas were 
lodged in the American wilderness, and this 
great American West took them to her bosom, 
taught them a new way of looking upon the 
destiny of the common man, trained them in 
adaptation to the conditions of the New World, 
to the creation of new institutions to meet 
new needs; and ever as society on her eastern 
border grew to resemble the Old World in its 
social forms and its industry, ever, as it 
began to lose faith in the ideals of democracy,




she opened new provinces, and dowered new 
democracies in her most distant dominions 
with her material treasures and with the 
ennobling influence that the fierce love of 
freedom, the strength that came from hewing 
out a home, making a school and a church, 
and creating a higher future for his family, 
furnished to the pioneer.1
The frightening aspect of Turner's Americanization theory 
was that it implied that, when the "most distant dominions" 
of the continent had been settled, the Americanization pro­
cess must cease. To the immigration restrictionists, such a 
thought menaced the future of American democracy and civili­
zation.
Roosevelt and Turner taught the virtues of the pioneer
life to the American public at the very time when Americans
were beginning to hear of the impending disappearance of the
frontier. The spokesmen for immigration restriction combined
these ideas and discovered a vital new stimulus for halting
the flow of immigrants to the United States. The fact that
modern historians have shown that most immigrants did not go
to the West even when lands were available does not contradict
the power of such a belief. Americans of the late nineteenth*
century sincerely believed that the frontier had attracted 
12immigrants, and thus, to them, the loss of the frontier re-
X1Ibid., p. 267.
12Turner declared that immigrants "obviously" had been 
attracted by cheap lands: ibid., p. 21.
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moved the most important factor that had contributed to the 
assimilation of immigrants. Without the frontier, Americans 
believed that immigrants would be forced into cities, where 
they would threaten the stability of the nation.
Various writers of the 1880's and 1890's emphasized this 
theme, some in an attempt to hasten the passage of restriction 
laws, others as a means to promote governmental measures that 
would help develop the unsettled portions of the West. 
Brigadier-General Nelson A. Miles, in an 1890 article for 
The North American Review, agreed that pioneer life produced 
an American character, and that the dwindling of good lands 
in the West meant that those who now sought asylun in the 
United States could only turn to a degraded life in the cit­
ies. On the basis of this information, Miles called for 
federally sponsored immigration projects to open the arid
lands of the West to settlement and provide new areas for the
13future of the pioneer life. To others, however, the loss of 
the frontier as an Americanizing process implied that the 
United States should begin to stop immigration. Josiah Strong 
declared that the decline of the public domain, and the conse­
quent appearance in the cities of "little Germanies here, 
little Scandinavias there, and little Irelands yonder," up­
set the whole system of Americanization: "Our safety demands 
the assimilation of these strange populations, and the process
13Nelson A. Miles, "Our Unwatered Empire," The North 
American Review, CL (March, 1890), pp. 370-371.
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of assimilation will become slower and more difficult as the
proportion of foreigners increases. Francis Amasa Walker
also agreed that the pioneering process traditionally had
promoted America’s democratic growth: ’’None can doubt that
both the increase of our population and its expansion over a
continually wider territory, have been the chief causes of
the remarkable development among us of that public spirit
1Swhich we call patriotism.1' But with the lands of the West 
disappearing, immigrants were pouring into the cities, divid­
ing into separate colonies, speaking their own languages,
1 6refusing to adapt to **a land of free laws and educated labor." 
The inability of the immigrants to assimilate into American 
society was, to Walker, Strong, and other leaders of the peri­
od, the most frightening aspect of late nineteenth-century 
immigration.
Richmond Mayo-Smith, as usual, provided the most cogent 
exposition of the theme. Assimilation, in fact, was Mayo- 
Smith' s most basic concern in the entire immigration question,
14Strong, Our Country, p. 45. In the 1891 revised edi­
tion of the book, Strong noted that another means of American­
izing the immigrants, the public school system, was likewise 
threatened by recent immigration, particularly by Catholics 
who demanded their separate schools: Strong, Our Country 
(rev. ed.; New York: The Baker and Taylor Co., 1891), pp. 79- 
106.
15Address at Brown University, 1889. Quoted in Ray Allen 
Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, p. 121.
1 fiWalker, "Immigration," p. 134.
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and his belief that the immigrants of the 1880's and 1890's 
did not assimilate as readily as. had earlier arrivals led him
to call for restriction. He was too discerning an observer
ever to state that the closing of the frontier was the only 
factor that impeded assimilation, but he certainly saw it as 
one of the factors, and he often used the idea in his writ­
ings.
The frontier life, Mayo-Smith declared, had, in the 
early years of the nation, allowed the United States to assim­
ilate foreigners easily; but as that type of life disappeared, 
the country should consider a re-evaluation of its immigration 
policy.
We are no longer in that vigorous early civ­
ilization when we could digest almost anything
sent to us and when the conditions of life here
corrected and controlled the weaknesses of the 
immigrants. In a frontier life, the new-comer 
not only has a chance to begin over but, in a 
sense, he is obliged to do so. He is thrown on 
himself and obliged to look out for himself . .
. . At the present time the conditions are en­
tirely different. The immigrant . . . finds in 
this country, especially in our large cities, 
exactly the same environment that he has come 
from. He may if he chooses take up the same 
life here which he has left on the other side 
of the water. If he is weak in resolution, the 
temptation will be strong to stick to the old 
familiar ways instead of sticking out in a new 
and difficult path.l?
With free lands disappearing, Mayo-Smith declared, and with
Americanization made that much more difficult, the United States
could no longer admit just anybody. The nation had to enact
legislation to remove the undesirable, more unassimilable
l^Mayo-Smith, "Control of Immigration, I," pp. 68-69.
!
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elements from the flow of immigrants. In two articles on
18assimilation for the Political Science Quarterly in 1894, 
he emphasized this idea. Race mixture in general, Mayo-Smith 
suggested, was a corruptive force within a nation, so that 
the promotion of assimilation by intermarriage of different 
racial stocks in the United States was a retrogressive idea. 
Assimilation, the fusing of various peoples, institutions, 
and customs into a composite American nationality, could be 
promoted effectively only through the influence of the social 
environment and the physical environment. Mayo-Smith was 
optimistic about the capacity of the American social environ­
ment- -particularly the public education system--to Americanize 
foreign-born citizens. But, he noted ominously, the disappear­
ance of the frontier threatened the survival of the other fac­
tor promoting assimilation, the physical environment and the 
frontier life.
The frontier life, Mayo-Smith asserted, had been the 
"most powerful influence" in the development of the nation. 
Constant struggle against nature had promoted self-reliance 
and self-government, and by such a process the immigrant had 
become "a pioneer of civilization." He had abandoned his old
traditions, and had adopted new American customs and pioneer 
19traits. But now Americans no longer could rely on that
l^Mayo-Smith, "Assimilation of Nationalities in the United 
States," Political Science Quarterly, IX (September, December, 
1894), pp7 " 426 - 444, G'WFTJBY
19Ibid., p. 440.
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experience as an assimilating element.
It may be remarked, in passing, that this 
'assimilating force, which has so powerfully 
influenced our past history, tends to become 
less prominent with the settling up of the 
country. The frontier life is largely a 
thing of the past. The best land has been 
taken up. The conditions of living over a 
great portion of the country are similar to 
those of Europe. A larger and larger propor­
tion of the population live in towns and cities 
where these primitive influences are not 
felt . . . .  Now the immigrants find here men 
of their own tongue, newspapers in their own 
language . . . .  They sink into positions al­
ready opened for them, and they find an environ­
ment suited to their previous habits.20
The result was that the immigrants remained European, instead 
of becoming Americans, and they thus threatened American so­
ciety.
Mayo-Smith*s major work, Emigration and Immigration, is 
at bottom an extended study of the process of assimilation in 
the United States. Mayo-Smith believed that a stable society 
had to be as homogeneous as possible, and that immigrants who 
did not assimilate retarded the growth of American civiliza­
tion.
A nation is great, not on account of the number 
of individuals contained within its boundaries, 
but through the strength begotten of common 
national ideals and aspirations. No nation can 
exist and be powerful that is not homogeneous 
in this sense. And the great ethnic problem we 
have before us is to fuse those diverse elements 
into one common nationality, having one language, 
one political practice, one patriotism and one 
ideal of social development.21
2QIbid., p. 441.
21Mayo-Smith, Emigration and Immigration, p. 78.
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Mayo-Smith was concerned with the effects that immigration 
brought to American society, how immigrants destroyed homo­
geneity, and how it affected “the ethical consciousness of
2 2the community."
American civilization, Mayo-Smith proposed, consisted
of four basic elements: the tradition of freedom and self-
government; the social morality derived from Puritan New
England; a high standard of living for the working classes;
and beneficial social habits, such as a respect for law and
order, national patriotism, and confidence in the nation's
future. Immigration, he asserted, threatened air of these
23elements of civilization. The presence of thousands of new
voters with no training in self-government menaced the nation's
political institutions. Immigrant voters could be influenced
too much by city demagogues, or by the dictates of the
Catholic church, and the “importations of foreign agitators"
would bring anarchism and socialism to the United States.^
Immigration lowered the economic level of the American working





2 5Ibid., pp. 131-138. As a professional statistician, 
Mayo-Smith even produced a method of calculating the economic 
value of an immigrant, subtracting the cost of keeping him in 
the community from the amount of wealth he added to the commun­
ity, and capitalizing the result “at the current rate of 
interest" to derive the current value of the man: p. 109.
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Immigration threatened American morality and “the social 
health of the community11 by raising the levels of crime, vice,
7 fiilliteracy, and pauperism. The ''new" immigrants, in partic­
ular, ’’ignorant, criminal and vicious,” lacking "the faintest
appreciation of what civilization means,” presented an awesome
27danger to the nation.
The basis of the problem was assimilation. The new 
immigrants, Mayo-Smith believed, were so dangerous because 
they did not assimilate as had earlier immigrants, and one 
reason why they did not was the loss of the frontier. With 
most of the nation's lands settled, immigrants no longer filled 
the needs of a pioneer society; they went, instead, into cit­
ies and maintained their traditional European customs and 
28ties. This, according to Mayo-Smith, was not the only fac-
\
tor threatening the process of assimilation--the number and 
character of the new immigrants were really more important-- 
but it was one of the significant factors.
Mayo-Smith was, obviously, antagonistic toward the char­
acter of the immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. But 
his racial views did not dominate his thoughts on immigration, 
as was often the case with other spokesmen for restriction. 
Mayo-Smith held the general prejudices of his society--against
26Ibid., pp. 147-167. 
27Ibid., p. 133.
28Ibid. , pp. 96-97, 119 ,
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2 9blacks, against orientals, against non-Anglo-Saxons --but 
he was really more concerned with the economic and social 
problems caused by immigration. His argument, as a rule, was 
reasoned and calm, and he tried to keep his demands for re­
striction as free as possible from blatant bigotry.
The control of immigration must be free from 
the base cry of ’’America for the Americans," 
and from any narrow spirit of trade-unionism, 
or of a selfish desire to monopolize the labor 
market. It must find its justification in the 
needs of the community, and in the necessity 
of selecting those elements which will contrib­
ute to the harmonious development of our civil­
ization. 30
He did not ask for total prohibition of immigration, or for 
legislation directed specifically against any nationality 
(except the Chinese). He hoped to admit only those immi­
grants who could assimilate into American society, and he
called for appropriate federal legislation that would elimi-
31nate unassimilable elements. The problem to Mayo-Smith 
was basically one of Americanization in a society that could 
no longer rely on the assistance of the frontier.
The question of Americanization was really at the heart 
of all the pleas for immigration restriction in the late nine­
teenth century, and, in that respect, the loss of the frontier




as an Americanizing force constituted the most important ele­
ment for restrictionists who used the frontier theme. Racial 
fears and the fears of the exhaustion of the public lands com­
bined most effectively in that type of argument.
Racial prejudice in itself probably could have generated 
a drive for immigration restriction. But in the 1880's and 
the 1890's, the pervasive sense of the impending loss of the 
public domain, the related fear of the disappearance of a 
frontier safety valve, and the belief that without a frontier 
the Americanization of immigrants was no longer assured, all 




The Americans of the 1880's and 1890's who opposed the 
idea of immigration restriction--and a sizable number did-- 
devised one simple method of countering the restrictionists' 
emphasis on the closing of the public lands. They simply 
pointed to the West and said, "Look at all that empty land." 
The unfortunate disadvantage of such a rejoinder was that, 
more often than not, these spokesmen were pointing at worth­
less lands.
On the surface, of course, the idea of declaring the 
American continent in danger of overcrowding seemed an absurd 
one. "A man looking out on the vast, fertile, and as yet 
sparsely-peopled sections of the South-west," wrote New Jersey 
Congressman William McAdoo, "is not apt to dread unrestricted 
immigration as much as he who daily views the scenes of our 
great cities and those of mining and railroad centers."1 
Carl Schurz, perhaps the nation's most distinguished immi­
grant, agreed: "In such a country, which is capable of
nourishing five times its present population, it is simply
■^William McAdoo, "Immigration and the Tariff," The 
Forum, XI (June, 1891), p. 398.
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ridiculous to speak of overcrowding."
Many other Americans, both politicians and private citi­
zens, denounced the idea of halting immigration on the basis 
of declining public lands. Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, 
speaking against the proposed contract labor bill in 1885, 
ridiculed the theory.
The vast fields which are open now to settle­
ment in our public domain, and where we ex­
tend an invitation for settlement to every man 
who will come here and declare his intention 
of becoming a citizen of the United States, 
are sufficient for the next twenty-five or 
perhaps fifty years to absorb the unemployed 
labor of all the civilized countries of 
Europe that has any possible chance of emi­
grating to this part of the world.3
The United States Commissioner of Immigration echoed the state­
ment in 1892: "Our resources have hardly been touched, cer­
tainly the point of exhaustion has not been approached, so 
that development is feasible and desirable."^ A few years 
later his successor noted that the 1894 report of the Immigra­
tion Investigating Commission suggested that most Western areas 
were still trying to attract workers and settlers.'* Some
2Carl Schurz, "Restricting Immigration," Harper’s Weekly, 
XLII (January 8, 1898), p. 27.
3U. S., Congress, Senate, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb­
ruary 13, 1885, Congressional Record, XVI, p. 1632. See also 
the remarks of Senator Coke of Texas, ibid., pp. 1788-1790:.
4John B. Weber, "Our National Dumping-Ground: A Study of 
Immigration," The North American Review, CLIV (April, 1892), 
p. 425.
^Joseph H. Senner, "The Immigration Question," Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, X 
CJuly'TlW)", p. 17.-----  ------- ----- -------- --
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writers, such as Senator Henry C. Hansbrough of North Dakota,
even used vast expansionistic dreams to prove that there
would be plenty of room for immigrants.
There is ample room in the United States for 
500,000,000 of people. By the time our popu­
lation shall have reached one-fourth that number 
the northern boundaries of the Union will have 
been extended to the south coast of Greenland.
Shall we for a single moment turn back the tide 
of willing workers who are to level and tunnel 
the mountains and subdue the forests?^
Even Henry George, so concerned about the appropriation of the
lands, was quoted as saying that the nation could support many
more immigrants.
I do not believe any restriction whatever upon 
the immigration of people from Europe and of 
the Caucasian race, who are not diseased and 
who are not chronic paupers or criminals, is 
needed, or is in accordance with the spirit of 
our institutions. We should have room enough 
for the whole population of Europe, were not 
our lands monopolized, and were they taken from 
the grasp of those who hold them for no other 
purpose than the hope of profiting by their 
increasing value.'7
There was, in fact, even in the depression years of the 1890's,
considerable optimism concerning the nation's potential growth.
A few authors devoted entire articles to refuting the fron­
tier theme of the restrictionists, an indication of how power­
ful the theme had become. In an 1892 article entitled "Incalc­
ulable Room for Immigrants,*' Edward Atkinson, a New England 
businessman, tried to show that, even if the frontier had dis­
appeared, plenty of land remained.
&Henry C. Hansbrough, "Why Immigration Should Not Be Sus­
pended," The North American Review, CXLVI (February, 1893),
p. 224.
7Quoted in Wm. E. Chandler, "Methods of Restricting Immi­
gration," The Forum, XIII (March, 1892), p. 137.
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The argument upon which the proposition for . . . 
exclusion is based seems to be mainly that our 
free land has been disposed of by the Government, 
and that we have no longer any land to give away.
That may be admitted. What has it to do with 
the question? The disposal of land by original 
owners, either the government, the state, or 
private persons, has no necessary connection g 
with the occupancy and productive use of land.
Atkinson, noting the thousands of acres of unoccupied lands in 
the Southwest and even in parts of the East, believed that immi­
grants easily could purchase farmlands from their current 
owners: MAny one who chooses can become possessed of land
by purchase from private owners at this time at less cost to 
himself than when nearly the whole of the Western prairies 
were open to free occupancy under the homestead law . . . .
Land itself is more easily obtained than ever before.”
According to Atkinson, the frontier had somehow both dis­
appeared and survived.
C. J. Buell, writing in The Arena in 1894, also answered 
the frontier argument in a rather illogical manner. Buell 
first indicated that a government had no moral right to legis­
late against immigration in the first place, becasue the 
freedom to move about the globe was one of man's natural 
rights.
Have you, my reader, a right to change your 
habitation from St. Paul to California? Most 
certainly. Then that same right you must 
accord to every other one of your fellow-men.
8Edward Atkinson, "Incalculable Room for Immigrants," 
The Forum, XIII (May, 1892), pp. 361-362.
9Ibid., pp. 362-364. Quote from p. 364.
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Have you a right to expatriate yourself and 
become a citizen of England, China or 
Afghanistan? With equal emphasis you reply,
"Of course I have.1' Then you must accord 
that right to every other person on earth.10
But Buell was more concerned with showing that immigration was 
still a material benefit to the United States, and that there 
should be ample lands upon which immigrants could settle. Ob­
viously a disciple of Henry George, Buell declared that land 
monopoly provided the only problem of the period, and that the 
existence of land monopoly deluded Americans into believing 
that their continent was overcrowded. If land monopoly were
eliminated by the single tax, Buell proposed, immigrants would
11be able to settle in the West in large numbers.
Look at this fair America of ours to-day, and 
see how few and how scattering are its people.
More than all the inhabitants of the United 
States could live in peace and comfort east of 
the Alleghany Mountains were it not for the 
curse of land monopoly. Less than half the 
land even in New York City is really occupied 
and used. More than half is only partially used 
or is held idle by speculators who expect to 
reap large profits from the increase of values . ~ 
which always comes with increase of population.
By opening up the remaining lands as they should be, Buell 
suggested, the country would have abundant space for an in­
crease of population.
Another writer, Simon G. Croswell, in 1897 vehemently 
contradicted the idea that the United States had reached the
1 (I)C. J. Buell, "Immigration and the Land Question," 
The Arena, X (November, 1894), p. 807.
11Ibid., pp. 809-813. 
l^Ibid. t p t 813.
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saturation point in population: "Can the most ardent advocate 
of the Malthusian doctrine claim that the United States al­
ready has too many inhabitants, or is in danger of having too 
many in the immediate future? Do we not rather need to en­
courage immigration, to fling wide open the gates of our
country and secure as large an addition to our working force 
13as possible?” Croswell believed that the undeveloped lands 
of the West, "where the average percentage of population to 
the area of the land dwindles in some localities almost to 
the vanishing point," still cried out for settlers.14 A 
large number of Americans of the late nineteenth century would 
have agreed with such a view.
Those who claimed that the nation still had plenty of 
room for immigrants were correct in a literal sense. There 
was an abundance of empty land in the West, By the 1890*5, 
however, many Americans had begun to realize that the lands 
that did remain available were not suitable for cultivation 
by a yeoman homesteader. Throughout the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century, several spokesmen, and John Wesley 
Powell, in particular, warned that the United States no 
longer could expect the arid lands of the Western states to 
provide profitable 160-acre homesteads. Most of the remaining
13Simon Greenleaf Croswell, "Should Immigration Be Re­




lands, Powell declared, were certainly fertile, but could 
be cultivated successfully only by means of an extensive and 
expensive system of irrigation.*^ By the 1890's, Americans 
had begun to listen to Powell’s words, and their realization 
of the fact that much of the public domain was arid contrib­
uted to the general fear aroused by the doctrine of the clos­
ing frontier.
For the purposes of a single immigrant farmer--of whom 
there were relatively few in the first place--much of the 
frontier, then, had closed by the 1890's. The desert and 
mineral lands that remained available were of little use to 
a solitary, unskilled immigrant without capital, nor were 
the potentially productive irrigable lands. There was an 
agricultural frontier existing in 1890, but it was one that 
required large amounts of capital, something that few immi­
grants possessed. In this respect, the restrictionists who 
claimed that the closing of the public lands meant a decline 
in opportunity for the immigrant were, to an extent, correct.
The writers who opposed the theory of the disappearing 
frontier did not realize this fact, and, in their eagerness 
to combat immigration restriction, resorted to arguments often 
as irrational as those used by the restrictionists. C. J. 
Buell declared that the United States should welcome the bene­
fits provided by immigrants just as a man alone on a desert
*^See, e.g., J[ohn] W[esley] Powell, ’’The Irrigable Lands 
of the Arid Region,” The Century Magazine, XXXIX (March,
1890), pp. 766-776.
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island would welcome new arrivals, apparently forgetting that 
a nation of some sixty million persons was not quite the same
1 f \as a man on an island. Edward Atkinson displayed his
ignorance of New England farmlands by claiming that immigrants
could make profitable use of the lands abandoned by earlier
Northeastern farmers, and somehow devised the notion that only
17a few immigrants actually settled in cities.' Atkinson, 
furthermore, could not understand that it was more difficult 
for a poor immigrant to purchase land from a private owner 
than it was to obtain land cheaply from the federal govern­
ment. Nor did Simon Croswell realize that aridity was a major
reason for the low man-land ration in much of the West.
The opponents of immigration restriction argued most 
effectively when they emphasized the traditional role of the 
United States as an asylum for the oppressed of all nations. 
That belief was yet strong in the 1880's and 1890's. When, 
however, they claimed that an abundant supply of free land 
remained in the West, they were contradicting one of the 
dominant fears of the era. The fact that these opponents 
believed themselves obligated to attack the frontier theme 
shows how important that theme had become by the 1890's. Many 
parts of the West itself, in fact, had turned against further 
immigration by the time of the depression of the 1890's, and 
several Western states had closed down their immigration
■^Buell, "Immigration and the Land Question," pp. 809-810.
17Atkinson, "Incalculable Room for Immigrants," pp. 364- 
365. John B. Weber likewise asserted in 1892 that two-thirds
of the nation's immigrants were going west to farms! "Our
National Dumping-Ground," p. 425.
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18bureaus. Regardless of the dubious merits of their attacks 
on immigration, Francis Amasa Walker, Richmond Mayo-Smith, and 
the other spokesmen who connected the closing of the frontier 
to their campaign for restriction, had devised a powerful argu­
ment and one accurately designed to meet the fears of a genera­
tion 'Of Americans who believed that their frontier was ending.
18Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 73-74. For a con­
temporary view, see "Immigration, Past and Present,” Review 
of Reviews, III (July, 1891), pp. 571-572. — _
CHAPTER VIII
THE VALIDITY OF THE FRONTIER THEME
Fear of the closing of the public lands, obviously, was 
not the only reason for the rise of immigration restriction 
in the 1880*s and 1890's, nor was it the most important rea­
son, Labor competition, dread of socialism and radicalism, 
rising urban problems, and the crises of the industrial age, 
were all of major importance in turning Americans against 
immigration. Even more significant was the prevalent social 
and racial prejudice against the "new" immigration. Many of 
those who used the frontier argument themselves admitted as 
much, Francis Amasa Walker, for example, after one of his 
lengthy discussions of the declining public domain, proceeded 
to a topic that troubled him even more: "But, in my view,
it is not in the increasing numbers which the fast-rising 
tide of immigration is bringing to our shores, that the 
chief danger to the republic, politically and industrially, 
is found. It is in the character of the new arrivals."^ 
Walker then emphasized that he did not hope to prevent 
thrifty Swedes, Norwegians, and Germans from coming to the 
United States, only the degraded peasants of southern and
^Walker, "Immigration," p. 130.
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2eastern Europe. Prescott F. Hall also showed decisively that
declining space was not his main concern: "If immigrants be
undesirable the fact that there is land enough for many times
the population which we now have in the United States would be
generally conceded to be an inadequate reason for admitting 
3them." The Review of Reviews agreed that the loss of the
frontier was only one aspect of the restriction movement.
The free homestead area in the United States 
is practically exhausted, and the westward 
agricultural migration has been carried already 
beyond the safe limits of the rain-belt, with 
the inevitable result of disappointment, local 
distress and occasional abandonment of drouth- 
afflicted lands. This would account in part 
for the revulsion of American feeling on the 
subject of immigration. But the change in the 
character of immigrants affords no less weighty
a reason.^
The editorial then proceeded to condemn the recent influx of 
impoverished peasants.
Racial bias, furthermore, lay behind Josiah Strong's fear 
of immigration, and Strong believed that the Anglo-Saxon race 
had a holy duty to spread its dominance first over the Ameri­
can West, and then over the entire world.^ Even Richmond Mayo- 
Smith displayed his prejudices, although he usually referred 
to the blessings of Anglo-Saxon "civilization" rather than the 
Anglo-Saxon "race."
^Ibid. , pp. 130-141.
3Hall, "Immigration and the Educational Test," p. 393. 
^"Immigration, Past and Present," p. 572.
5See, e.g., Strong, Qur Country, pp, 144-180.
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Congress, likewise, moved toward restriction more out of 
fear of the new immigration than because of the idea of the 
closing frontier. Congressional debates on the immigration 
bills of the 1880’s and 189G's indicate considerable anxiety 
over labor competition and the character of the new immigrants,
but show little concern with the exhaustion of the public
£
domain. Even Henry Cabot Lodge, who had used the frontier 
argument before, did not mention the idea when in 1896 he 
gave his lengthy speech to the Senate on behalf of the lit­
eracy test bill. Lodge instead emphasized the manner in 
which the new immigration threatened the quality of Anglo- 
Saxon citizenship. President Cleveland gave his understand­
ing of the problem in his veto message of 1897 : "It is not
claimed, I believe, that the time has come for the further 
restriction of immigration on the ground that an excess of 
population overcrowds our land. It is said, however, that
Qthe quality of recent immigration is undesirable."
See, e.g., these volumes of the Congressional Record: 
XIII, pp. 5105-5113; XVI, pp. 1621-1636, 1778-1791; XXII, 
pp. 2740-2741, 2945-2959; XXIX, pp. 1423-1433.
7U.S., Congress, Senate, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., March 
16, 1896, Congressional Record, XXVIII, pp. 2817-2820. See 
also John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933), pp. 141-145.
8Reprinted in Abbott, Immigration? p. 199. An 1891 
Congressional report had suggested a s"imilar idea: "The time 
is far in the future when we will suffer from an overcrowded 
population. The territory of the United States will support 
seven times our present inhabitants. It will be fifty years 
before statesmanship need apprehend a burden from the influx 
of desirable aliens, but the time now is, and always will be, 
when the undesirable should be prohibited a landing in our 
country." U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Select
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The fact that the fear of the new immigration overshadowed 
the fear of the exhaustion of the public lands, however, does 
not mean, as one historian has suggested, that the immigration 
restrictionists were secret racists who "dared not resort to 
racist tactics and so seized on the closing of the frontier
Q yto justify laws against all newcomers." For one thing, the 
supporters of immigration restriction in the late nineteenth 
century were not prone to deception. They displayed their 
prejudices freely and openly, and, in the context of the era 
of social Darwinism, their prejudices against certain nation­
alities were not considered out of the ordinary. Ethnocentrism 
was a widespread attitude in America in the 1880's and the 
1890's, and there would have been no need for restrictionists 
to hide their true feelings behind a smokescreen provided by 
the frontier argument. They willingly discussed both their 
attitudes toward the new immigrants and their fears of the 
closing of the frontier, because they sensed both sincerely, 
and they found a logical connection between the two.
The leading restrictionists, moreover, were prominent, 
respectable, and often worthy men who would have had no rea­
son purposely to deceive the American public. Josiah Strong 
was, after all, a devout minister who firmly believed that he 
spoke the truth. He once wrote, in fact, that he thought he 
was "right where God wanted me to be, and doing just the work
Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, House Report 
3472, 51st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1891, p. ix.
^Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner, p. 110.
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He wanted me to do.”"^ Strong spent most of his life apply­
ing his Christian principles to the problems of American 
cities, and trying to awaken American Protestants to the 
responsibilities of the urban-industrial age. Despite his 
unflattering racial biases, therefore, he must be considered 
a respected and respectable man of his era, not the type 
of leader who would deliberately invent an argument in which 
he did not believe.
Francis A. Walker, also, despite his obvious hostility 
toward the ’’stagnant pools of population” from southern and 
eastern Europe, was not the type of man who had to stoop to 
guile to present an anti-immigration viewpoint. He was a 
distinguished public servant, the president of a leading 
educational institution, and the most renowned American eco­
nomist of his era. Richmond Mayo-Smith, as well, was a 
respected academic leader, and a man who maintained an admir­
able tone of rationality in his writings. Such men would 
not have invented fears about the closing of the frontier 
simply to make a point; they had to have been concerned about 
those fears themselves.
Finally, the fear of the exhaustion of the public lands 
was one that permeated a huge number of Americans in the late 
nineteenth century, not just those who opposed immigration. 
The fear was a profound one, strong enough to stand on its 
own; it had its own origin and its own existence, just as did
10Strong, My Religion in Everyday Life (New York, 1910), 
p. 49. Quoted in Muller, Josiah Strong and the Challenge of 
the City, p. 9.
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the fear of immigration. The belief in the closing of the 
frontier was by no means the source of the immigration re­
striction movement of the 1880’s and 1890’s, nor was it the 
only impetus behind the movement. But many spokesmen of 
the period did perceive both fears, combined the two, and, 
in their own minds, believed that such a connection provided 
an even more impelling reason for accelerating the campaign 
for restriction of immigration.
CHAPTER IX
EPILOGUE: LATER FEARS
Despite the fears aroused by extensive immigration, by 
the exhaustion of the public lands, and by the general climate 
of doubt, the United States did not enact a stringent system 
of immigration control in the 1880's and 1890's. The restric­
tion laws of 1882, 1885, and 1891 were generally aimed at pro­
hibiting entry only to "undesirable elements;" they were vague 
and impossible to enforce. Further Congressional attempts to 
place harsher controls over immigration then subsided for a 
few years after President Cleveland's veto of Lodge's literacy 
test bill in 1897.
The entire restriction movement, in fact, declined con­
siderably in the years immediately following the veto. By 
1899 The Nation could note that the literacy test bill and 
the general demand for further controls were topics that the 
country no longer discussed: "An issue of considerable impor­
tance has thus practically disappeared from our politics."^" 
Such a reduction in the clamor for restriction was due, in 
large measure, to the general decline in the numbers of immi-
^"The Fading Out of an Issue," The Nation, LXIX (October 
19, 1899), p. 294. For a contemporary attack on the veto, 




grants in the late 1890’s. Annual immigration had begun a
downward trend in 1893, and in 1897 and 1898 immigration
2reached its lowest level since 1879, the ultimate result of 
the worldwide depression of the 1890’s, In 1897 the United 
States Commissioner of Immigration declared that immigration 
had "fallen to such small figures as to be absolutely insig-
3nificant as compared with our own enormous population."
Under such circumstances, the efforts of even the most ardent 
restrictionists waned.
More important to the fading of the restriction campaign, 
however, was the general mood of confidence that, for a time, 
returned to the United States in the late 1890’s. As the 
nation's economy revived, as labor conflict subsided briefly, 
as the country began to search for overseas markets, a sense 
of complacency and unity replaced tensions and doubts.
Nativism in the late nineteenth century, as always in American 
history, had been a manifestation of internal unrest, and as 
that unrest dissolved, hostility toward immigrants abated.^
The direct fear of the closing of the frontier subsided 
as well in the late 1890's as the nation turned to a search 
for new, external frontiers in the expansionistic climate of 
opinion that followed the Spanish-American War. Concentra-
^The Statistical History of the United States from Colo-' 
nial Times to the Present, ppT 5 6 - S 7 .
SSenner, "The Immigration Question," p. 6.
^Higham, Strangers in the Land, pp. 106-111; Higham, 
"Origins of Immigration Restriction," pp. 87-88; Jones, Amer­
ican Immigration, pp. 260-262,
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tion on a new frontier reduced the fears associated with the 
loss of an old one, and the frontier theme never again inter­
twined so closely with the cause of immigration restriction as 
it did in the 1880’s and 1890's, when the anxiety created by 
the loss of the public domain was so immediate and pervasive.
Hysteria against immigration, of course, eventually 
reached new heights in the twentieth century, in the years 
following the first World War. That hysteria, however, re­
sulted from a new set of tensions and a new lack of confidence 
that developed after 1917. Resentment .against the "new" 
immigration had reappeared in the early 1900's with a new wave 
of immigrants, and had commanded nationwide attention through 
the forty-one-volume report of the Dillingham Commission in 
1911. But in the aftermath of World War I, even more exten­
sive fears created widespread demands for restriction. The 
internal campaign for "100 per cent Americanism," fear of 
German immigrants during the war, the incredible hostility 
aroused by the Palmer raids and the Red Scare in the early 
1920's, and the corrosive sense of disillusionment and isola­
tionism that dominated postwar America, all led to the eventual 
adoption of a rigid system of immigration restriction. The 
strict quota system that Congress established in the 1920's 
reduced immigration to a fraction of what it had been earlier, 
and eliminated much of the immigration from southern and 
eastern Europe. The nation had finally decided upon an ignoble 
attempt to bolster its own confidence and sense of unity.
126
The fears aroused by the closing of the frontier in the 
late nineteenth century^ therefore, had been exceedingly 
acute, but they had not been powerful enough to drive the 
nation completely to rigid immigration restriction. The 
anxiety, caused by a belief in the exhaustion of the public 
lands had provided a strong argument for restriction, and 
had intensified the campaign against immigration, but it had 
not been quite strong enough to carry that campaign to an 
ultimate conclusion. Only an even more disturbing group of 
fears in the 1920's could do that.
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